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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation encompasses three chapters. The first chapter examines the effect of 
information disclosure policy on triggering peer effects among firms that influence their 
compliance decisions. The second chapter examines how environmental attitudes change with 
economic conditions and whether short-run changes in environmental attitudes translate into 
policy changes. The third chapter examines the impact of electoral votes on the distribution of 
ad hoc agricultural farm disaster payments in the US. 
There is growing policy-level interest in the use of information disclosure as a regulatory 
instrument to improve firms’ behavior. However, little has been done using micro-level data to 
investigate whether information provision may trigger peer influence among firms that that 
affects their compliance behavior. Using station-level inspection verification data from the 
Mexican gasoline market, the first chapter examines whether gas stations react to peers’ 
performance to adjust their own compliance decisions. The information disclosure policy 
assigned each inspected gas station with green, yellow, or red colors to indicate the status of 
compliance, minor violation, and severe violation, respectively. We find strong evidence of peer 
influence triggered by information spillover. The probability of being in compliance increases as 
the number of green peers increases. We use both municipalities and postal codes as 
geographic boundaries to define potential peers, and find similar results. Our findings also 
indicate that the magnitude of peer effects varies across municipalities: the effects appear to 
be greater in richer, more educated communities. 
A unique feature of the environment is that the consequences of its use are often difficult 
or impossible to reverse. This implies that short-run changes in environmental policies can 
result in long-run effects. In the second chapter, we estimate how environmental attitudes 
change with economic conditions and whether short-run changes in environmental attitudes 
translate into policy changes, as proxied by voting for Republicans and by changes in 
representatives’ voting behavior. We find that a 1% increase in a state’s unemployment rate 
decreases the probability of a respondent prioritizing environmental protection over economic 
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growth by 0.21-0.67%. A 1% decrease in the mean county income decreases that probability by 
0.11-0.12%. However, there is no relationship between changes in citizens’ ideology and 
changes in their voting patterns or the voting patterns of their congressional representatives. 
Overall, we show that even though respondents’ attitudes toward the environment are 
influenced by economic conditions, they do not immediately translate into changes in real 
outcomes. 
The third chapter examines the impact of electoral votes on the distribution of ad hoc 
agricultural farm disaster payments across counties from 1990 to 2008. We find evidence that 
parties play a significant role in determining the allocation of payments. Our results show that, 
when the Republican party controlled Congress, counties with a higher share of Republican 
votes received more payments. Similarly, the share of Democratic votes is positively related to 
the size of payments when the Democratic party controlled Congress. We find consistent 
results in our congressional district-level analysis: majority party members secured more 
payments to their constituents than minority party members. These results are consistent with 
the idea that political parties target distributive benefits to their loyal constituents, supporting 
the core voter hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
Many thanks are due to my advisors Barrett Kirwan and Tatyana Deryugina, for their support 
and guidance that made it possible for me to finish this dissertation. It was a pleasure working 
with them. I would like to express my gratitude to other members of my dissertation 
committee, Alex Winter-Nelson and Richard J. Brazee, for their valuable feedback on the papers. 
I am also grateful to Nicholas Brozović and Andrea Martens for their guidance and financial 
support during my first three years in the ACE department. Many thanks to department staff 
who provided assistance during my PhD study and preparation of this dissertation. Finally, I 
thank my wife YuanYuan and my parents, for their constant love and support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1    Regulatory Compliance, Information Disclosure and Peer Effect: Evidence from the 
Mexican Gasoline Market ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2   Institutional Background ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.3   Impact of Information Disclosure and Peer Effects ...................................................................... 7 
1.4   Econometric Model ....................................................................................................................... 8 
1.4.1   Construction of Peer Effect ................................................................................................ 8 
1.4.2   Estimation Strategy .......................................................................................................... 10 
1.4.3   Identification of Peer Effect ............................................................................................. 12 
1.4.4   Data and Summary Statistics ............................................................................................ 14 
1.5   Estimation Results ....................................................................................................................... 15 
1.5.1   Impact of Peer Influence .................................................................................................. 15 
1.5.2   Heterogeneity in the Peer Effect ...................................................................................... 16 
1.6   Robustness Tests ......................................................................................................................... 18 
1.6.1   Falsification Test ............................................................................................................... 18 
1.6.2   Sample Selection .............................................................................................................. 19 
1.6.3   Evidence from Postal Code Level ..................................................................................... 21 
1.7   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 22 
1.8   Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................................... 25 
1.9   References ................................................................................................................................... 34 
Chapter 2    Do Recessions Affect Environmental Concern and Does it Matter for Real Outcomes? .... 38 
2.1   Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 38 
2.2   Conceptual framework and Related Literature .......................................................................... 39 
2.2.1   Environmental Preferences .............................................................................................. 39 
vi 
 
2.2.2   Citizens’ Voting Behavior ................................................................................................. 41 
2.2.3   Representatives’ Voting Behavior .................................................................................... 42 
2.3   Data Description and Summary Statistics ................................................................................... 43 
2.4   Empirical Strategy ....................................................................................................................... 46 
2.4.1   The effect of unemployment rates and income on prioritizing the environment ........... 46 
2.4.2   The effect of environmental concern on citizens’ and representatives’ voting behavior48 
2.5   Results and Discussion ................................................................................................................ 50 
2.5.1   The effect of unemployment rates and income on environmental concern ................... 50 
2.5.2   The effect of environmental concern on citizens’ and representatives’ voting behavior51 
2.6   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 54 
2.7   Appendix ..................................................................................................................................... 55 
2.8   Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................................... 56 
2.9   References ................................................................................................................................... 68 
Chapter 3   Party Effects in the Distribution of Agricultural Disaster Payments ................................... 71 
3.1   Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 71 
3.2   Agricultural Disaster Payment in the U.S. ................................................................................... 74 
3.3   Data and Empirical Model ........................................................................................................... 76 
3.4   Results ......................................................................................................................................... 80 
3.5   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 83 
3.6   Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................................... 85 
3.7   References ................................................................................................................................... 94 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter   1 
 
Regulatory Compliance, Information Disclosure and Peer 
Effect: Evidence from the Mexican Gasoline Market 
 
1.1   Introduction 
 
Information asymmetry has long been viewed to complicate market transactions and result in 
social inefficiencies (Akerlof, 1970). To overcome information asymmetries, government 
mandatory information disclosure programs have recently been applied in many policy contexts 
to provide credible information to help potential buyers, investors and other stakeholders make 
informed decisions. These information disclosure policies are predicated on the notion that 
responses of the public will motivate firms to improve their performance. In some regulatory 
contexts, information disclosure policies are also expected to force firms to improve 
performance that would otherwise require costly enforcement and implementation costs, 
enabling governments to achieve regulatory targets more efficiently.1 
A growing number of empirical studies have examined the effectiveness of information 
disclosure as a policy instrument on influencing firms’ and consumers’ decisions. These studies 
have covered a wide variety of contexts, including toxic chemical emissions (Hamilton, 1995; 
Konar and Cohen, 1997; Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova, 1998; Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante, 
2002); food safety (Jin and Leslie, 2003); nutritional labeling (Mathios, 2000); drinking water 
violations (Bennear and Olmstead, 2008); electric utility industry (Delmas, Montes-Sancho and 
                                                            
1 For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has applied a few public disclosure policies as 
regulatory instruments for improving environmental performance. Examples include the Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI), the Consumer Confidence Reports (CCR), and mandatory lead paint disclosure. Environmental economists 
have referred to information provision as the third-wave regulatory instrument in environmental regulation, after the 
first wave of command-and-control policy and the second wave of market-based instruments (Tietenberg, 1998). 
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Shimshack, 2010); financial markets (Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006), and 
political electoral outcomes (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).  
Notwithstanding this growing number of literature, an important unanswered question 
about is whether information spillover could trigger peer influence among firms. In many 
markets, firms need to compete with each other to attract consumers. If potential consumers 
utilize the information related to product quality and attributes to make purchase decisions, 
good performers are more likely to attract business and gain higher profits. These good 
performers may exert a kind of peer pressure on their competitors to improve performance to 
avoid loss of consumers. On the contrary, firms do not have strong incentives to improve 
behavior if they find their competitors are bad performers. In this sense, firms are responsive to 
the performance of peers while making their own behavior decisions. In economics literature, 
this structural construct has usually been referred to as “peer effects”, “peer influence” or 
“contagion”.  
This paper investigates whether information disclosure could trigger peer influence among 
firms. Specifically, this paper focuses on an information disclosure program of the Mexican 
gasoline market. Prior to 2006, many Mexican gasoline stations had been dispensing 
incomplete liters to consumers, selling less gasoline than was indicated by the pumps. 
Regulatory monitoring and monetary sanctions failed to reduce violations because of high 
monetary benefits from selling incomplete liters. In August 2006, the Mexican government 
implemented an information disclosure program in which the inspection results of all gas 
stations since 2005 were disclosed to the public through its official website. Each inspected 
station was assigned with green, yellow, or red colors to indicate the status of compliance, 
minor violation and severe violation, respectively. This government rating system aimed at 
providing market-based incentives for stations to decrease deviant behavior.  
This paper uses firm-level panel data from Mexican gas stations to estimate whether gas 
stations react to peers’ behavior to adjust their own compliance decisions. To this end, we 
extend the previous work on rational criminal model (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970). In our model, 
gas stations’ compliance decisions are a function of their own attributes, regulatory deterrence, 
as well as their peers’ compliance status indicated by assigned colors. We define municipalities 
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as geographic boundaries for peer groups and establish two peer effect measures: The first is 
the percentage of green stations among peers and the second is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if all peers are green stations. We apply station fixed effects model to control for any 
unobserved time-invariant station and municipality characteristics that may induce a 
correlation in compliance decisions.  
In a general setting, it is difficult to identify this peer effect since it is likely to be 
confounded by price and quality factors. For example, firms may choose to lower the price 
rather than improve performance to offset the negative impact of a bad image. If consumers 
are responsive to this price change, it is hard to identify the effect of peers in affecting behavior.  
The setting of the Mexican gasoline market makes it ideal to examine this peer effect. First, 
the physical attributes of regular gasoline are identical across sellers, and PEMEX is the only 
gasoline brand in Mexico. From a consumption point of view, consumers would not have 
different preferences toward different sellers in terms of the characteristics of gasoline. This 
setting eliminates the impact of consumers’ heterogeneous preference on compliance decisions. 
Second, the price of gasoline is set by the government, and all retail stations sell gasoline at the 
fixed common price. This setting does not allow gas stations to use the strategy of lowering 
prices to remedy degraded reputation. These advantages allow us to identify peer effect while 
avoiding the confoundedness of price and quality factors.  
Our results present strong evidence of peer influence. Both peer effect measures are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Based on our preferred specification, if all 
peer stations were assigned green colors, the probability of being in compliance is predicted to 
increase by 0.036. This significant peer effect remains after we exclude the stations that were 
always in compliance (green) and those always in violation (non-green) during the entire period. 
We examine a variety of statistical models to determine the robustness of the finding that 
peer influence exists among gas stations. We first run a falsification test, whereby we use the 
inspection verification records from January 2005 to July 2006 to test the significance of peer 
effects. During this pre-disclosure period, the compliance information of gas stations was not 
available. We find that the peer effect is no longer significant. Because the cross-section units 
are almost the same for the two verification samples, the results suggest that information 
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disclosure was a driving force triggering peer influence among stations. We also use a bivariate 
probit model with sample selection to address the sample selection problem that we observe 
gas stations’ compliance performance only if they were inspected. Consistent with previous 
results, we still find a strong, positive peer effect on the probability of being in compliance. 
Finally, we examine this peer effect at a more localized level by defining potential peers for a 
gas station as all other stations within the same postal code, and find similar results. 
 Furthermore, we find that the peer effect is heterogeneous across municipalities. Other 
things being equal, gas stations located in richer, more-educated municipalities are more 
responsive to peers’ behavior than those located in poorer, less-educated municipalities. The 
results indicate that community pressure is an important factor affecting the magnitude of peer 
influence. 
Our paper makes important empirical contributions to the extant literature on information 
disclosure policies. This study is among the first to document the existence of peer influence 
caused by information spillovers. The identification of significant peer influence helps us 
understand how firms make strategic decisions in response to information disclosure. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on peer effects. In much of the broader 
literature, peer effects usually refer to the externalities that arise when an individual behavior is 
influenced by the behavior and the characteristics of a reference group.2 The existence of peer 
effects indicates that a policy intervention will not only change some individual’s behavior 
directly, but also indirectly affect the behavior of their peers. Therefore, knowledge of the 
existence of peer effects is important to evaluate the effects policy interventions. There is a 
large body of literature that has documented the interplay between individual behavior and 
peer effect in a variety of settings: criminal activities (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; 
Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), education (Sacerdote, 2001; Cooley, 2007), obesity (Cohen-Cole 
and Fletcher, 2008), employment (Conley and Topa, 2002), productivity of workers (Knez and 
Simester, 2001; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; Falk and Ichino, 2006), and many others.3 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze peer effects within the setting of 
                                                            
2 Depending on different settings, past literature also called “peer effects” as social interactions, social networks, 
social multipliers, peer influences, conformity and contagion effects.  
3 See Blume, et al (2011) for a survey of papers on social interactions.  
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information-based regulation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction on 
the regulatory setting of the Mexican gasoline market. Section 3 demonstrates the impact of 
information disclosure and peer effect on affecting compliance performance. Section 4 presents 
the empirical approach and the summary statistics. Section 5 provides and interprets the main 
empirical findings. Section 6 conducts robustness checks and section 7 concludes.  
 
 
1.2   Institutional Background  
 
In Mexico, all retail gasoline stations are franchises of the state-owned oil company Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX), a sole domestic gasoline distributor that supplies all types of commercial 
gasoline to Mexican consumers. PEMEX is the only gasoline brand in Mexico and all gas stations 
have to display PEMEX logos. Gasoline prices are set by the Ministry of Finance, and all retail 
stations are required to sell gasoline at a fixed common price.4 It is a mandatory requirement 
that all service stations must be operated in accordance with the Mexican Official Standards 
(NOMs) that regulate measuring and dispensing systems for delivery of gasoline and other 
liquid fuels.  
Mexico’s Federal Consumer Attorney’s Office (PROFECO) is a government agency 
responsible for inspecting pumps at gas stations to check compliance with the existing official 
norms. Before 2005, inspection results showed that many stations had been dispensing 
incomplete liters to consumers. The cheating was achieved through restructuring electronic and 
mechanic parts of gas pumps so that the actual gasoline volume dispensed was less than the 
volume indicated on the pump’s register. Although PROFECO made regular inspections and 
imposed monetary sanctions on cheating stations, the deviant behavior was not uncommon. 
PROFECO officials once estimated that 45% of the gas stations in the country had dispensed 
incomplete liters, generating embezzlement against consumers at a cost of more than nine 
                                                            
4 Although determined by the government, gasoline prices are not completely identical throughout Mexico. The 
government allows for higher gasoline prices in some northern border areas because many American consumers 
choose to come over the border to purchase gasoline in Mexico to take advantage of price differences between the 
two countries.   
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billion pesos, or 0.71 billion US dollars, per year (EI Universal, 2006). In 2005, a government-
initiated survey demonstrated that more than 60% of gas consumers believed that retail 
stations had overcharged them (PROFECO, 2005).  
There are several explanations for this regulatory failure in the Mexican gasoline market. 
First, inspection frequencies were low. On average, each gas station was inspected only once a 
year.5 Second, after identifying a violation, PROFECO had to stage a long administrative legal 
process in the courts to punish noncompliance gas stations, and only some of the violators 
were finally penalized. Third, even though a gas station received a monetary sanction, 
monetary fines were small relative to the high monetary gains from dispensing incomplete 
liters. Guerrero (2010) estimated that in 2006, gas stations found in severe violation of selling 
incomplete liters in Mexico City gained about $32,000 from cheating, while the fine levied was 
just about $12,000.   
Starting from 2005, PROFECO took several steps to reduce the fraudulent behavior of 
overcharging consumers. By issuing the new official standard NOM-005-SCFI-2005 in 
September 2005, PROFECO updated the regulatory standards regarding fuel specifications, 
gasoline quality, and the operation of measuring instruments. According to the new official 
standard, PROFECO needs to inspect each operating gas station at least once a year. For each 
inspection, PROFECO staff makes an on-site investigation and verification to evaluate whether 
the station has proper equipment, operating in accordance with the specifications set forth in 
the official standards. A particular inspection focus is to test whether gas stations dispense the 
correct amount of gasoline for which consumers pay.  
In August 2006, PROFECO initiated an information disclosure program in which the 
inspection histories of all operating gas stations since 2005 are displayed through its official 
website. The website assigns each inspected station a color-coded rating based on inspection 
results over the previous six months. Red color indicates severe violation, yellow color indicates 
minor violation, and green color indicates compliance.6 Although the definition of violation 
                                                            
5 Discussion with government officials indicates that the main reason for lax monitoring efforts is the constraint 
of enforcement resources.  
6 A red color is assigned to a gas station if the following circumstances occur: refusal to be inspected by 
PROFECO staff, selling incomplete liters that dispense less than 0.985 liters per liter sold, gasoline price forgery, or 
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covers several irregularities, the most common reason for receiving red and yellow colors is 
selling incomplete liters. The compliance information is updated once a month and is disclosed 
based on municipality level. If a gas station was not inspected in the previous six months, it 
appears with no color. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show two examples of the color-coded ratings for 
two municipalities.  
 
 
 
1.3   Impact of Information Disclosure and Peer Effects 
 
Theoretical models in regulatory economics examining deterrence-based enforcement 
instruments date back to the economics of crime described by Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970). 
They constructed a rational criminal model to show that criminals have incentive to commit 
crime if the expected value of the crime is greater than the expected cost of the crime. 
According to the model, gas stations have incentives to violate regulations if the expected 
benefits of doing so outweigh the expected penalties. In a typical regulatory environment, the 
expected penalty is primarily determined by the probability of being caught and the size of 
penalty. The expected benefit is the monetary gains from violating regulations. As stated in 
section two, monetary benefit from selling incomplete liters was very high while inspection 
frequencies and the magnitude of fines were low. Consistent with the rational criminal model, 
the high benefits and low costs of violation explain why many gas stations chose to overcharge 
consumers to extract higher profits.  
The provision of compliance information told gasoline consumers something that they 
wanted to know but did not know previously. Consumers can now use the information to 
update their beliefs regarding gas stations’ credibility, adjusting their purchase decisions 
accordingly. A consumer can boycott a red gas station he used to visit by switching to a nearby 
green station, thereby lowering the probability of being defrauded. Because gasoline is a 
homogenous good with the price set by the government, gas stations cannot use the strategy 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
altered electrical and synchronizing components of the machine. Yellow colors are assigned given the following 
circumstances: selling incomplete liters that dispense greater than 0.985 but smaller than 0.995 liters per liter sold, 
leaking pipes, repeatability error, and dispensers temporarily out of service due to mechanical or electronic failure.  
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of lowering prices to offset the negative impact of poor compliance records. Therefore, 
receiving a non-green color will degrade a station’s reputation, decreasing its prospective 
gasoline demand. This result indicates that poor compliance records increase the expected 
costs of noncompliance.   
Why are gas stations concerned about their peers’ behavior? An explanation is that the 
negative impact of receiving a non-green color on gasoline demand is dependent on peers’ 
behavior. If a gas station observes that most of its neighboring competitors were rated as green 
stations, it may predict a high expected cost of noncompliance since gasoline consumers face 
low transaction costs (primarily transportation) to switch to alternative green stations. 
Therefore, the gas station has stronger incentives to achieve green rating to prevent a 
significant loss of gasoline demand. On the other hand, if a gas station observes that many of its 
competitors are red or yellow stations, it may predict a low expected cost of noncompliance 
since consumers face high transaction costs to switch to green stations. A rational consumer 
may still choose to buy gasoline from a non-green station to avoid a higher transportation cost 
of traveling a long distance to green stations. It is particularly true since consumers know that a 
green station in a previous inspection may become a red station while they are purchasing 
gasoline, and vice versa.  
This peer influence hypothesis indicates that gas stations use peers’ behavior to adjust the 
impact of a non-green rating. Gas stations facing strong peer pressure (more green gas stations) 
may rationally react to this situation by being in compliance to avoid high cost of 
noncompliance. By contrast, gas stations facing weak peer pressure are more likely to sell 
incomplete liters to extract higher profits.  
 
 
 
1.4   Econometric Model  
1.4.1   Construction of Peer Effect 
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine whether gas stations’ compliance decisions 
are influenced by peers’ performance. To measure this peer effect, we need to choose a 
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geographic market to define the boundary of peers for a focal gas station. Based on our dataset, 
we define potential peers for a station as all other stations located in the same municipality. 
This geographic definition of peer group is reasonable in this context, as gas stations that are 
geographically close are likely to become competitors in selling gasoline. We should note that, 
for big municipalities, the geographic boundary of competitors should be much smaller than the 
municipality.7 Fortunately, most Mexican municipalities are small in areas, having only a few 
gas stations. Therefore, it is still reasonable to use the municipality to define peer groups.  
According to the PROFECO disclosure policy, the compliance information of gas stations is 
updated once a month. Gas station managers can observe other stations’ color-coded ratings 
over the previous six months. We first construct a continuous peer effect measure: for each gas 
station i in municipality j in time period t, peer effect is measured as the percentage of green 
peer stations in the municipality in the past 6 months. The mathematical expression is 
described as: 
 
                     
  
∑                           
        
                               (1) 
 
where         denotes the total number of inspections made to station i’ peers located in 
municipality j over the previous 6 months.8 By assumption station i is excluded from its peer 
groups.                is the indicator that the peer station k was assigned green color in 
the previous 6 months. The numerator is the total number of green peers for the gas station i.9 
We should note that gas stations in the same municipality are only potential peers. They 
                                                            
7 A better choice is to use the number of surrounding competitors according to the proximity to the station. For 
example, count the number of stations within a one or two-mile radius of each station. However, this measure is not 
available in this study.  
8 We use “t-1” to denote that the compliance information is based on the inspection records over the previous 6 
months, not including current month.  
9 For example, in November2010, the PROFECO website should disclose the compliance information during the 
period May 2010 to October 2010. For a gas station i, if it observes that 10 colors were assigned to its peers in the 
municipality, and 6 were green colors, then the peer effect is measured as 0.6 (6/10).   
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become actual peers for a focal station only if they were inspected in the previous 6 months.10 
Therefore, the actual peer group for a given station changes over time. We believe that using 
percentage rather than number of green stations is more reasonable since the Mexican 
municipalities are quite heterogeneous in population and market size.11  
In addition to the continuous measure, we also construct a binary peer effect variable that 
indicates the case of 100% green peer stations. That is:  
 
        
  {
                        
    
                                  
                 (2) 
 
For this binary indicator, a value of 1 implies strong peer pressure. If a violation is detected, the 
gas station is likely to face significant loss of gasoline demand since the transaction cost of 
consumers to switch to green stations is low. So we expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and probability of being in compliance.  
 
 
1.4.2   Estimation Strategy 
 
To estimate the impact of peer influence on compliance behaviors, we begin with the baseline 
estimating equation: 
 
                             
                                      
 
where i indexes gas stations, j indexes municipalities and t indexes the inspection time. In the 
model, an observation is a gas station inspection. As a compliance indicator,               
equals 1 if the inspected station i in municipality j receives green rating at time t and 0 
otherwise;    are station fixed effects,     are state by year fixed effects,    are month of the 
                                                            
10 For example, a municipality has 10 gas stations. For a focal gas station i, if only 4 peer stations were inspected 
in the previous 6 months, then equation (1) is only determined by the performance of the 4 stations, and the other 5 
stations are irrelevant, though they are potential peers for the station i.  
11 Here, market size refers to the total number of gas station in the municipality.  
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year indicators, and      is the usual time variant idiosyncratic shock. The station fixed effect 
controls for any time-invariant station and municipality unobservable characteristics that would 
otherwise confound estimates of the relationship between peer effect and compliance 
decisions. The coefficient of interest is beta, representing the impact of peers on influencing the 
compliance behaviors of gas stations. A positive sign indicates that gas stations tend to be in 
compliance as more competitors are rated as green stations. 
    are a vector of time-varying deterrence factors that might influence gas stations’ 
performance. According to the rational criminal model, two important deterrence factors are 
probability of being inspected and penalty size. We first consider variables that may be relevant 
to the probability of being inspected. It is quite common for regulators to use past compliance 
information to target future inspections, so stations with bad performance are more likely to 
receive inspections in the near future. We include two dummy variables to represent past 
violation status. The first equals 1 if the gas station was assigned at least 1 red color in the 
previous 12 months, and the second equals 1 if it was assigned at least 1 yellow color in the 
previous 12 months. These variables are used to capture the deterrent effects of non-green 
colors. Gas station managers may also predict the probability of an inspection based on past 
inspection activities made by the regulator in the municipality. If they observe that more of 
their peer stations were recently inspected, they may expect a high probability of being 
inspected in the near future. To capture this spatial spillover effect of inspection, we include a 
variable that measures the total number of inspections conducted in the municipality over the 
previous six months, normalized by the total number of gas stations.  
We do not observe the monetary sanctions imposed on noncompliance stations. PROFECO 
imposed monetary sanctions based on violation severity, and red stations receive much higher 
monetary sanctions than do yellow stations.12 We include a variable that is a count of the total 
number of red colors received by the station from 2005 January. This variable is used to 
approximate the impact of monetary sanctions imposed on the gas station.  
 
 
                                                            
12 In many cases, PROFECO just sent warnings to yellow stations and made no monetary penalties on them.  
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1.4.3   Identification of Peer Effect 
 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into (3), we can use the variation of peers’ performance to 
identify the impact of peers on compliance decisions. However, identification of causal peer 
effects from behavioral data is challenging. First, identification of peer effect is subject to 
simultaneity or reflection problem (Manski 1993) if compliance behavior of gas station i 
influences the behavior of station j, and vice versa. The reflection problem arises because the 
impact of the reference group behavior on a station’s behavior cannot be distinguished from 
the impact of the station’s behavior on the reference group behavior. Moreover, Manski (1993) 
also concludes that, in the context of a linear-in-means model, simultaneity in behavior of peers 
results in a perfect collinearity between the expected mean outcome of the group and its mean 
characteristics. This problem hinders the identification of the endogenous peer effects from the 
effects due to the exogenous characteristics of the group. We use several steps to minimize the 
impact of this reflection problem. In our model, we assume that gas station i is excluded from 
its reference group, and we use past decisions made by peers, rather than simultaneous 
decisions, to estimate the peer effect on compliance decisions. In other words, the individual 
gas station behavior at time t is affected by group behavior in previous periods but not vice 
versa. This strategy avoids the problem of simultaneity and allows us to achieve the 
identification of peer effects. It is a common empirical strategy to use lagged reference group 
behavior to address the reflection problem to identify peer effects (Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998; 
Clark and Lohéac, 2007; Manchanda, et al., 2008).13 
The second identification issue is self-selection or endogenous peer group formation. This 
problem arises if unobserved characteristics cause some individuals to choose to join the same 
neighborhood or peer group, and also cause them to behave similarly (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; 
Moffitt, 2001; Weinberg, et al., 2004). For instance, high ability students may sort themselves 
into peer groups with other high ability students. Labor economics literature usually called this 
                                                            
13 However, this strategy of using lagged reference group behavior implicitly assumes that the errors are not 
correlated for individuals within the same peer group. We try to achieve this assumption by adding station fixed 
effects and state by year fixed effects, but we acknowledge that our model cannot guarantee no autocorrelation 
among gas stations in the same municipality.   
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movement as sorting of individuals across locations (Topa, 2001). Using experimental data is 
one way to address this endogenous self-selection issue (Bertrabd et al., 2000; Sacerdote, 
2001). In our context, the self-selection problem arises if a gas station could self-select to a peer 
group based on unobserved determinants of compliance performance. However, the gasoline 
industry in Mexico is highly regulated, and it is the government to determine the necessity of 
opening a new gas stations. Therefore, we believe that the self-selection problem does not 
arise in this study since the peer group is defined by geographical boundary and gas stations are 
hard to move to other peer groups.  
This study is more likely to be subject to the problem of correlated effects, as described by 
Manski (1993) and Moffitt et al., (2001), in which agents in the same group tend to behave 
similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional 
environments. In this study, if there are some unobserved municipality or station factors that 
affect compliance decisions of all municipal gas stations in a similar way, then we are likely to 
obtain a spurious relationship between the peer effect and individual performance. For 
example, gas stations from different locations may face different community pressure against 
bad performance. This pressure may come either from consumers or from local governments. If 
community pressure forces local gas stations to improve their behavior, we will find positive 
peer effect but actually none exists. To minimize the bias caused by correlated effects, we take 
advantage of our panel dataset structure and incorporate station fixed effects. This approach 
eliminates any unobserved time-invariant station and municipality characteristics that have 
common effects on the outcome of all gas stations within the group, such as community 
pressure, local political attributes and geographic location.14 We also include state by year fixed 
effects to capture common time-varying factors at the state level, such as market or policy 
shocks.    
 
 
 
                                                            
14  In related literature, it is a popular strategy to solve the problem of correlated effects by using within 
transformation in linear panel data models to eliminate unobserved variables (Bramoulle, et al., 2009) 
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1.4.4   Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The primary source of our data is the on-site inspection verification records of Mexican 
operating retail gasoline stations provided by PROFECO.15 The dataset covers the period from 
January 2005 to April 2011. For each inspection, the record provides the station identification 
number, geographic location, the date of inspection, an array of compliance performance 
measures, and the color-coded ratings indicating compliance status.16 Because a few stations 
dropped or entered the market during this period, we merged the inspection verification data 
with the official list of entering and exiting gas stations. The list provides the identification 
number and the year of the stations that dropped or entered the market during 2003 to 2011.17 
Combining the two datasets, we can generate the two peer effect measures based on 
equations (1) and (2). We also generate other explanatory variables specified in equation (3). 
Because our focus is peer effect, we exclude observations if the municipality has only 1 gas 
station. Moreover, because the information disclosure program was effective from August 2006, 
we exclude inspections from January 2005 to July 2006 since gas stations could not observe 
their peers’ compliance performance during this period. 
Our cleaned dataset contains 7,431 gas stations from 827 municipalities, spanning from 
August 2006 to April 2011. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. It shows that 68% of the 
inspections assigned green ratings, 22.2% assigned yellow ratings and about 10% assigned red 
ratings. The most common reason for receiving yellow and red colors is selling incomplete 
liters.18 Notwithstanding the information disclosure policy, approximately one third of the 
inspections detected violations, indicating high monetary profits from overcharging consumers. 
The mean continuous peer effect is about 0.67, meaning that on average 67% of peer stations 
                                                            
15 Because the latest official norm required PROFECO to inspect each operating gas station at least once a year, 
we believe that the inspection verification records should cover most Mexican operating gas stations.  
16 The primary performance measures include: whether the station refused to be verified by inspectors, amount 
of incomplete liters, failing calibration, repeatability error, electrical anomalies and leaking pipes. 
17 The Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information of Mexico allows anyone to 
demand information from federal government departments and bodies. We sent our requests directly to PEMEX and 
obtained the list.   
18 For example, about 84% of red stations were assigned red colors because they either sold incomplete liters or 
refused to be verified by inspectors. Because refusal to inspection automatically results in receiving red color, gas 
stations that refused to be inspected indicate that they were selling incomplete liters in a significant amount.  
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were rated as green stations in the previous 6 months. The sample sizes for peer effect 
variables are smaller because in some cases PROFECO made no inspection for a municipality in 
the previous 6 months.  
 
 
 
1.5   Estimation Results 
1.5.1   Impact of Peer Influence 
 
In this section, we present evidence on whether gas stations’ compliance behaviors are subject 
to peer influence. Table 2 shows the results from several station fixed effects estimations. We 
first estimate equation (3) by linear probability model and report the results in the first four 
columns.19 All standard errors are clustered by municipality level. The specifications in the first 
two columns only use peer effect measures as explanatory variables. Columns (3) and (4) 
extend the specification by incorporating additional covariates.  
The results indicate a positive and statistically significant peer effect: gas stations are more 
likely to be in compliance as more peers are rated as green stations. For example, column (4) 
shows that, after controlling for time-invariant station and municipality fixed effects as well as 
time-variant state by year fixed effects, the probability of being in compliance is predicted to 
increase by 0.036 if all peers were assigned green colors. This positive and very significant peer 
effect holds for all linear probability specifications. The evidence supports our hypothesis that 
peer influence plays an important role in shaping compliance performance of gas stations.  
We also use a conditional fixed effect logit model as an alternative specification and the 
results are reported in columns (5) to (8). Unlike fixed effect probit model, we can use logit 
model to get consistent estimates without any assumptions of the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity. In addition, fixed effect logit model excludes the stations that were always in 
compliance or were always in violation during the entire period, since these data contain no 
                                                            
19 Although the dependent variable is binary, we do not use fixed effect probit model to avoid the inconsistency 
caused by incidental parameter problem. The problem cannot be ignored in this study since we have a large number 
of fixed effects.  
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information for estimating parameters. This unique feature results in a reduced sample size. It 
only contains the stations that once ever changed the status of compliance and violation in 
their inspection histories, thereby providing a robustness check for the previous analysis.20 
Though the coefficients are not immediately comparable to those from OLS, all logit 
specifications indicate a positive and statistically significant peer effect at the 1% confidence 
level.21 
 
 
1.5.2   Heterogeneity in the Peer Effect    
 
Our baseline model described in equation (3) implicitly assumes that the peer effect is identical 
across all gas stations, regardless of their locations. However, it is possible that the peer effect 
also depends on some community characteristics. Previous studies have shown that local 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are important in determining the degree of 
which firms respond to the release of data on firms’ performance (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 
1995; Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Earnhart, 2004).  
In this section, we estimate a model that allows for the peer effect to vary depending on 
local community characteristics. The underlying hypothesis is that the marginal effect of peer 
influence on affecting stations’ performance is conditional on community characteristics.  To do 
this, we collect and generate three municipality-level demographic characteristics based on the 
2010 Mexican Population and Housing Census. The first is the number of gas stations in each 
municipality, normalized by municipal population. This characteristic is used to measure 
competition level among gas stations. A conventional wisdom is that competition can pressure 
firms to view their reputation in the community more seriously, and thus have strong incentives 
to improve performance as they find their competitors are green stations. Initial statistical 
analysis shows that the competition measure is quite heterogeneous and highly skewed, so we 
                                                            
20 Some gas stations made the decisions to be always in compliance (green) or always in violation (non-green) 
due to some unobservable factors. These gas stations are unlikely to be subject to peers’ behaviors.   
21 Fixed effect logit model cannot provide average partial effects estimation, since we have no information about 
the distribution of the fixed effect. See Wooldridge (2010).  
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take the log of it to reduce the impact of outliers on our results. We also use average years of 
schooling and median household income to measure the degree of community pressure that 
gas stations face. A variety of literature has documented that educational attainment and 
income level are two important characteristics that may affect firms’ performance (Brooks and 
Sethi, 1997; Arora and Cason, 1999; Earnhart, 2004).  
To examine the conditions under which peer influence is most evident, we estimate 
equation (3) by interacting the peer effect with these three community characteristics. 
Estimates of the interaction terms are presented in Table 3. We find that the magnitude of the 
peer effect varies dramatically depending on municipality education and income levels. In 
particular, the significant and positive estimates of the two interaction terms indicate that gas 
stations located in richer, more educated municipalities are more responsive to changes in 
peers’ performance than stations located in poorer, less educated municipalities. This is 
consistent with empirical findings reported by Pargal and Wheeler (1996) that community 
pressure plays an informal regulator role in affecting firms’ performance. However, our results 
do not support the hypothesis that gas stations located in competitive municipalities are more 
responsive to peer influence. We also run fixed effect logit model and find qualitatively similar 
results. 
As an alternative approach, our panel data structure allows us to estimate a random 
coefficient model that the effect of peers is allowed to vary with municipalities. Specifically, we 
estimate a model of the form:   
 
                                                             
 
where    denotes that the peer effect is municipality-specific, rather than constant for all gas 
stations as shown in equation (3). We estimate the correlations between the estimated    and 
the variables of average years of schooling and median household income. Consistent with the 
previous results, we find that the two variables are strongly positively correlated with the 
estimated   . 
In sum, we do fine some evidence to support the hypothesis that the magnitude of peer 
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effect is dependent on community characteristics. Gas stations located in richer, more 
educated communities are more responsive to changes in peers’ performance. These 
communities may have high intellectual sophistication of residents, stronger local media 
attention to violations, and high internet access rate so that consumers are more 
knowledgeable about stations’ performance. All these characteristics are likely to exert strong 
local community opposition to noncompliance gas stations. By contrast, residents living in 
poorer, less educated communities may have less access to information regarding stations’ 
performance due to low internet access rate and local media attention to violations. Therefore, 
the impact of information disclosure on affecting gas stations’ performance is weak. The results 
show that firms take into account not only the response of their customers but also the degree 
of opposition they face from the communities in which they are located. Therefore, one policy 
implication is that governments should focus on facilitating information transfer in poor areas 
to enhance local community pressure against bad performance.   
 
 
 
1.6   Robustness Tests 
1.6.1   Falsification Test  
 
We run several tests to access the robustness of our results. We began by running a falsification 
test, whereby we re-estimate equation (3) by using the inspection outcomes from January 2005 
to July 2006, the period before PROFECO disclosed the compliance ratings of gas stations. We 
expect no peer influence among gas stations during this pre-disclosure period, since peers 
performance was not observable to station managers. The peer effect and compliance behavior 
of gas stations should be correlated only if an omitted variable is driving the main results from 
Table 2. Table 4 presents the estimation results. The eight specifications in Table 4 are identical 
to the specifications reported in Table 2. Consistent with our expectation, the peer effect is no 
longer significant for all specifications. Because the cross-section units are almost identical for 
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the pre-disclosure and post-disclosure periods, the results indicate that the PROFECO disclosure 
policy triggered the peer influence that affects compliance decisions. 
One concern about the previous falsification test is that the observations in the pre-
disclosure period are much smaller than those in the post-disclosure period, so the reduced 
sample size makes the standard errors bigger, and this is the reason why we cannot find 
statistical significance of the peer effects. To address this concern, we only use the observations 
from August 2006 to December 2007 to estimate equation (3). This period is temporally 
contiguous to the pre-disclosure period, and the sample size is more comparable to that in the 
falsification test. Table 5 shows the results. We find that, although the sample size is much 
smaller than that for the entire post-disclosure period, the peer effect is still positive and 
statistically significant. The magnitudes of the coefficients on peer effect are also much bigger 
than those in Table 4. This stark contrast from pre-disclosure to post-disclosure periods 
provides further evidence that the information disclosure policy caused peer influence.  
 
 
1.6.2   Sample Selection  
 
Another concern with our estimates is sample selection problem: we observe gas stations’ 
compliance performance only if they were inspected. If a station was not inspected there is no 
information on whether the station was in compliance.22 The previous analysis applies station 
fixed effects model to eliminate any time-invariant confounding factors that affect both 
compliance and inspection behaviors. However, if inspection behaviors are systematically 
related to some unobservable, time-variant characteristics of gas stations or municipalities, the 
previous analysis may not provide a causal relationship between peer effect and compliance 
decisions.23 To deal with this sample selection problem, in this section we use a bivariate probit 
model with sample selection developed by Van de Ven and Van Pargg (1981) that accounts for 
both compliance and inspection decisions.  
                                                            
22 Because we have collected repeated observations for each gas station and PROFECO needs to inspect every 
operating gas station at least once per year, this problem can be more accurately described as unbalanced panel: 
some stations may be more frequently observed than others.  
23 This means the inspection decisions is correlated with the idiosyncratic errors      in equation (3). 
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Specifically, we establish two equations to simultaneously estimate both the probability of 
inspection and the probability of compliance.  
 
      
      
                                       
 
      
     
                                          
 
where       
  and       
  are two unobservable latent variables, and the error terms      and 
     are assumed to have bivariate normal distribution with correlation  .    include peer effect 
and other covariates as described in equation (3).    and    represent gas station and 
municipality characteristics that may determine both compliance and inspection decisions. We 
can observe that 
 
            {
                
               
, and 
 
Compliance = {
                             
                             
 
 
Bivariate probit model with sample selection uses maximum likelihood to estimate 
coefficients by correcting the potential bias caused by the correlated errors of the outcome and 
selection equations. Since we can only observe 3 outcomes: (          ,            , 
      , the log likelihood is written as: 
     ∑                              ∑                                
                    ∑                  ),  
where   is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. 
Specifically, we establish a monthly panel for each gas station from August 2006 to April 
2011 that incorporates both compliance and inspection indicators. We capture an array of gas 
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stations and municipality characteristics that may affect compliance and inspection decisions.24 
The identification for bivariate probit model with sample selection requires an exclusion 
restriction: at least one variable affects inspection decisions but does not affect compliance 
decisions. We use the fraction of gas stations in the municipality that are inspected in the 
current month t. The variable is believed to meet the exclusion restriction because a popular 
inspection strategy is to use geographic clustering to target inspections to reduce inspection 
costs. Because current month inspection targets in a municipality are not common knowledge 
to gas stations, it should not affect compliance decisions and is omitted from the violation 
equation.  
Table 6 shows estimates of the impact of peers on a gas station’s likelihood of being in 
compliance. Because the probability of inspecting a station is not our interest, it only shows the 
results from the compliance equation. Column (1) shows the results from the baseline model 
using peer effect as the only covariate. Columns (2) to (4) extend the model by incorporating 
additional covariates. Consistent with previous results, all specifications indicate a strong, 
positive peer effect on the probability of being in compliance. The estimated   is negative as 
expected and statistically significant, indicating that the error terms of the two equations are 
negatively correlated.  
 
 
1.6.3   Evidence from Postal Code Level 
 
The previous analysis defines municipality as the geographic boundary for potential peers of a 
given gas station. One concern is that this definition may not accurately reflect the group of 
competitors for stations located in large municipalities. Even though two gas stations are 
located in the same municipality, they are not likely to become competitors if they serve 
different local neighborhoods, and thus there would be no peer influence between them. If 
peer effects influence compliance behaviors, we might expect to see evidence of peer effects at 
                                                            
24 Gas stations characteristics include number of pumps, sales in year 2010, whether the station provides full 
service, whether the station is first-hand sale station, whether the station was awarded by PEMEX for compliance. 
Municipality characteristics include demographics in year 2010: population, average years of schooling, economic 
participation rate, mean household income, and percentage of gasoline employees over population.  
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a more localized level than the municipality. To address this problem, we examine peer effects 
at a more localized level by defining potential peers for a gas station as all other stations within 
the same postal code. Compared with municipality, gas stations in the same postal code are 
more likely to become direct competitors because they serve the same neighborhood.  
In a similar approach, we use equation (1) to generate the measure for peer effect based 
on postal code. Other explanatory variables are generated at the gas station or postal code 
level. The Mexican inspection verification dataset provides postal codes for gas stations. 
However, some municipalities were missing postal code data, and the gas stations located in 
these municipalities automatically drop from the data.  The estimation results are shown in 
Table 7. Columns (1) to (3) are based on OLS and columns (4) to (6) are based on logit model. 
We again find significant and positive peer effect, even though we define postal code as the 
geographic boundary for potential peers.  
 
 
 
1.7   Conclusion 
 
There is growing policy-level interest in the use of information disclosure to improve firms’ 
behavior. This paper extends current literature by investigating whether information disclosure 
may engender peer influence that affects firms’ performance in the context of gasoline market. 
The underlying idea is that gas stations are concerned about peers’ performance because the 
expected cost of noncompliance is dependent on peers’ behavior. The Mexican gasoline market 
provides us an ideal experiment for this research because it has the following features: (1) 
disseminated compliance information is simple, understandable, and easily accessible to 
gasoline consumers; (2) gasoline consumers have strong interest in seeking compliance 
information to make informed purchase decisions to avoid monetary loss; (3) gasoline is a 
homogenous good and PEMEX is the only gasoline brand, so consumers should not have 
heterogeneous preference in terms of quality and brand; (4) gasoline prices are determined by 
the government, and gas stations cannot adjust price themselves and have to sell gasoline at 
the fixed common price.  
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Using station-level inspection verification data, this paper provides strong evidence of peer 
effects in affecting compliance decisions. Other things being equal, gas stations are more likely 
to be in compliance as they observe that more of their peers are green stations. We use both 
municipality and postal code as geographical boundaries to define potential peers and find 
similar results. This significant and positive peer influence is robust to several alternative 
specifications. Our findings also indicate that peer effects appear to be greater in richer, more 
educated municipalities. The results suggest that gas stations take account of both peer 
influence and community pressure when making compliance decisions.  
Our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence toward understanding how firms 
change their performance in response to peers’ performance disclosed by a government rating 
system. Understanding of such peer effects is essential for explaining firms’ strategic choice in 
an information-based regulatory context.  
The paper also provides several policy implications. First, the results suggest that, for a 
local neighborhood, inspectors are more likely to detect a violation when there are more non-
green gas stations detected by previous inspections. This practice of targeted inspections may 
maximize the effectiveness of scarce inspection resources by increasing the probability of 
catching violations. However, the existence of peer influence suggests that detecting a violation 
and then assigning a non-green color to the station yield a negative externality: it tends to 
increase the probability of violations of other stations in the same neighborhood because they 
anticipate lower expected cost of noncompliance. By contrast, disclosing a green station has a 
positive externality on increasing the compliance rates of other stations located in the same 
neighborhood. These findings suggest that policy makers might consider reinforcing 
enforcement actions against noncompliance stations, since an increasing number of green gas 
stations will exert peer pressure on neighboring stations to be in compliance. 
There are several limitations of this study, and we hope these can be addressed in future 
research. First, we use municipality or postal code as geographic boundary of peers. However, 
for those gas stations located near the boundaries of municipalities, their true competitors may 
come from other municipalities, rather than those stations located in the same municipality. 
The same problem applies to postal codes. Therefore, as mentioned in the main text, further 
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research should be done to identify peer groups in a more accurate approach. A possible choice 
is to use the number of surrounding gas stations according to the proximity to the station, such 
as a one or two-mile radius. Second, although we have used lagged peers behavior to address 
the simultaneity problem, our results are subject to potential bias due to the autocorrelation 
among gas stations. More advanced econometric method is expected to address this 
identification of peer effects in a dynamic panel data structure.  
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1.8   Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
VARIABLES Mean Std.Dev Observation 
Compliance indicators       
     Green color (dummy) 0.680 0.467 42,252 
     Yellow color (dummy) 0.222 0.416 42,252 
     Red color (dummy) 0.098 0.297 42,252 
Peer effect 
        Percentage of green stations in the municipality 0.672 0.250 38,171 
     All peer stations are green stations (dummy) 0.139 0.346 38,171 
Other explanatory variables 
       Got red color over the past 12 months (dummy) 0.117 0.322 42,252 
    Got yellow color over the past 12 months (dummy) 0.239 0.426 42,252 
    Total number of red colors received 0.466 0.899 42,252 
    Inspection strength 0.453 0.245 42,252 
        
 
Notes: The sample consists of 42,252 inspection observations from 7431 Mexican retail gas 
stations over the period of August 2006 to April 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
         Table 1.2: Peer Effect on Compliance  
 
  Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect Logit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Peer effect (percent) 0.068*** 
 
0.070*** 
 
0.613*** 
 
0.671*** 
 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.061) 
 Peer effect (0/1) 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.036*** 
 
0.235*** 
 
0.290*** 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.050) 
         Other Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.072 0.071 
    Observations 38,171 38,171 38,171 38,171 29,441 29,441 29,441 29,441 
Number of station 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306 4,910 4,910 4,910 4,910 
 
Notes: The sample spans the period from August 2006 to April 2011. The dependent variable is a compliance 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise. All equations are fixed 
effects models that absorb unobserved heterogeneity specific to stations. The standard errors are clustered in 
municipality level for the OLS specification.  
The sample sizes for columns (5) to (8) are smaller because fixed effect logit model necessarily excludes the 
gas stations that were always in compliance or always in violation during the period. The coefficients in 
columns (5) to (8) are not marginal effects.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
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Table 1.3: Heterogeneity of Peer effect 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Peer effect (percentage) 0.094** 0.075* -0.146* -0.149* -0.518*** -0.530*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.081) (0.082) (0.155) (0.159) 
Peer effect x Competition -0.011 -0.021 
    
 
(0.017) (0.018) 
    Peer effect x Education  
  
0.032*** 0.033*** 
  
   
(0.010) (0.010) 
  Peer effect x Income 
    
0.012*** 0.013*** 
     
(0.003) (0.003) 
       Other Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,171 38,171 37,715 37,715 37,682 37,682 
R-squared 0.021 0.053 0.022 0.054 0.022 0.054 
Number of Station 7,306 7,306 7,176 7,176 7,170 7,170 
 
Notes: The sample covers the period from August 2006 to April 2011. The dependent variable is a 
compliance dummy that takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise.  All 
equations are fixed effects OLS models that absorb unobserved heterogeneity specific to stations. The 
standard errors are clustered in municipality level.  
Competition is per capita number of gas station, Education is average years of schooling, and Income is 
median household income. 
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 1.4: Peer Effect on Compliance (Pre-Disclosure) 
 
  Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect Logit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Peer effect (percent) -0.021 
 
0.078 
 
0.144 
 
0.469 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.314) 
 Peer effect (0/1) 
 
-0.040 
 
0.026 
 
-0.099 
 
0.139 
  
(0.058) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.258) 
 
(0.326) 
         Other Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,267 5,267 5,267 5,267 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,831 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.229 0.229 .   . . 
 
Notes: The sample covers the period from January 2005 to July 2006. The dependent variable is a 
compliance dummy that takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise. All 
equations are fixed effects models that absorb unobserved heterogeneity specific to stations. The 
standard errors are clustered in municipality level for the OLS specification.  
The sample sizes for columns (5) to (8) are smaller due to the same reason as described in Table 2. The 
coefficients in columns (5) to (8) are not marginal effects.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 1.5: Peer Effect on Compliance from August 2006 to December 2007 
 
  Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect Logit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Peer effect (percentage) 0.139*** 
 
0.160*** 
 
0.647*** 
 
1.060*** 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.212) 
 Peer effect (0/1) 
 
0.043 
 
0.081*** 
 
0.213 
 
0.537*** 
  
(0.030) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.184) 
         Other Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
State Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,331 11,331 11,331 11,331 5,129 5,129 5,129 5,129 
R-squared 0.038 0.0353 0.285 0.282 . . . . 
 
Notes: The sample covers the period from August 2006 to December 2007. The dependent variable is a 
compliance dummy that takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise. All 
equations are fixed effects models that absorb unobserved heterogeneity specific to stations. The 
standard errors are clustered in municipality level for the OLS specification.  
The sample sizes for  columns (5) to (8) are smaller because fixed effect logit model necessarily excludes 
the gas stations that were always in compliance or in violation during the period. The coefficients in 
columns (5) to (8) are not marginal effects.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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     Table 1.6: Bivariate probit model of peer effect on compliance 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Peer effect (percentage) 0.513*** 0.516*** 0.500*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) 
ρ -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.143*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 
     Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Station characteristics No No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No No Yes 
Observations 383,647 383,647 355,174 355,174 
Wald test   22.36 25.61 93.23 12.22 
 
Notes: Specifications are bivariate probit model with sample selection. The table only shows the second 
stage (compliance equation) of estimation results. The dependent variable is a compliance dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are 
clustered in municipality level.  
We add the fraction of gas stations in the municipality that are inspected in month t into the inspection 
equation to meet the exclusion requirement. Wald statistic is used to test independence of equations. 
Each regression includes state dummy variables.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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       Table 1.7: Peer Effect on Compliance from Postal Code 
 
  Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect Logit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Peer effect (percent) 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.042*** 0.279*** 0.348*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) 
       Other Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.002 0.022 0.048 
   Observations 18,347 18,347 18,347 13,108 13,108 13,108 
Number of station 4,178 4,178 4,178 2,449 2,449 2,449 
 
Notes: The sample spans the period from August 2006 to April 2011. The dependent variable is a 
compliance dummy that takes the value of 1 if the station is assigned green color and 0 otherwise. Peer 
effect is measured as postal code level. All equations are fixed effects models that absorb unobserved 
heterogeneity specific to stations. The standard errors are clustered in postal code level for the OLS 
specification.  
The sample sizes for columns (4) to (6) are smaller due to the same reason as described in Table 2. The 
coefficients in columns (4) to (6) are not marginal effects.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Figure 1.1: Sample 1 of the Color Ratings of Gas Stations 
No. 
 
Domicilio Estado Razón social  
11032  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM- 2+740 
PABELLON DE ARTEAGA, 
AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  
ESTACION DE SERVICIO PABELLON, S.A.DE 
C.V.  
5117  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM. 24, PABELLON 
DE ARTEAGA, AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  SERVICIO ISALSO, SA DE CV  
5167  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM. 28.5, PABELLON 
DE ARTEAGA, AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  SERVICIO GALLEGOS E HIJOS, SA DE CV  
5167  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM. 28.5, PABELLON 
DE ARTEAGA, AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  SERVICIO GALLEGOS E HIJOS, SA DE CV  
10438  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM. 31+072, 
PABELLON DE ARTEAGA, 
AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  
MULTISERVICIOS ESPECIALIZADOS 
MORITA,S.A. DE C.V  
10438  
 
CARRETERA AGUASCALIENTES-
ZACATECAS KM. 31+072, 
PABELLON DE ARTEAGA, 
AGUASCALIENTES.  
AGUASCALIENTES  
MULTISERVICIOS ESPECIALIZADOS 
MORITA,S.A. DE C.V  
6778  
 
CARRT. LAS PALOMAS KM 2 S/N  AGUASCALIENTES  FLORES MARMOLEJO MARTA ESTELA  
1121  
 
PLUTARCO E.CALLES Y 14  AGUASCALIENTES  ESTACION BANDERA, S.A. DE C.V.  
 
Source: http://webapps.profeco.gob.mx/verificacion/gasolina/home_11.asp, accessed March, 4, 2013. The 
information is collected from the State of Aguascalientes and Municipality of Pabellon de Arteaga. There are six gas 
stations in the municipality. The stations with id 5167 and 10438 received 2 inspections in the previous six months, 
stations #11032, #5117, #1121 received 1 inspection, and station #6778 was not inspected. None of the gas 
stations got a red rating in the previous six months.    
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Figure 1.2: Sample 2 of the Color Rating of Gas Stations 
No. 
 
Domicilio Estado Razón social  
1057  
 
AV. JUAREZ # 199  CHIAPAS  ESTACIONES DE SERVICIO AUTO, S.A. DE C.V.  
10687  
 
CARRET PLAYAS DE CATAZAJA 
PALENQUE KM 25+900  
CHIAPAS  MULTISERVICIOS YAXCHILAN, S.A. DE C.V.  
2525  
 
CARRET VILLAHERMOSA-
ESCARCEGA KM.136  
CHIAPAS  DAGDUG Y PORTILLA,S.A.  
6875  
 
CARRT. CATAZAJA-PALENQUE KM 
26 # 111  
CHIAPAS  E.S.G.E.S., S.A. DE C.V.  
4868  
 
CARRT. PALENQUE-OCOSINGO KM 
0+0.55  
CHIAPAS  ESTACIONES DE SERVICIO AUTO, S.A. DE C.V.  
3917  
 
CRUCERO CARR. FRONTERIZA EN 
RIO CHANCALA  
CHIAPAS  
LA PUERTA DE LA SELVA LACANDONA ,S.A. DE 
C.V.  
 
Source: http://webapps.profeco.gob.mx/verificacion/gasolina/home_11.asp, accessed March, 4, 2013. The 
information is collected from the State of Chiapas and Municipality of Palenque. There are six gas stations in the 
municipality. The stations with id 10687 and 6875 were rated as red stations, and station #3917 was rated as 
yellow station. Station #2525 was not inspected.  
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Chapter   2 
Do Recessions Affect Environmental Concern and Does it 
Matter for Real Outcomes? 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
Environmental quality, such as clean air and clean water, is thought to be a normal good: as 
incomes increase, so does the relative demand for environmental quality. By making the 
average individual poorer and possibly by lowering expectations about future income, 
recessions should then lower the demand for environmental quality. If such changes in demand 
are accompanied by a weakening of environmental policy, recessions may cause permanent 
environmental damage. 
Recent economic recession in the U.S. provides us with a unique opportunity to examine 
the impact of a deteriorating economy on environmental concern. We estimate how 
environmental concerns change with economic conditions, using a nationally representative 
survey that spans eleven years and directly elicits individuals’ tradeoffs between economic 
growth and environmental quality. We use state-level unemployment rates and county-level 
incomes as proxies for local economic conditions. Our hypothesis is that environmental concern 
is inversely related to the health of the economy: we expect to see a decline in demand for 
environmental quality as unemployment increases or income decreases in the respondent’s 
state.  
We find strong evidence that willingness to sacrifice economic growth for environmental 
protection decreases with a state’s unemployment rate and increases with a county’s income. 
In our preferred specification, which includes state and year fixed effects, a 1% increase in the 
state’s unemployment rate decreases the probability that the respondent chooses 
environmental protection over economic growth by 0.21-0.67%. Similarly, a 1% fall in the per 
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capita income in the county decreases the probability that the respondent chooses to prioritize 
the environment over the economy by about 0.11-0.12%. Our results are consistent with the 
previous studies that economic conditions significantly influence public environmental concerns 
(Guber 2003; Kahn and Kotchen, 2011).  
In American politics, public opinion is an important factor in policy making process. 
Therefore, we then tackle the question of whether these changes in environmental attitudes 
translate into real policy effects, either through how individuals vote for their representatives 
or how their representatives vote in Congress.  
Because the Democratic Party is traditionally thought to be more concerned about the 
environment, we first consider whether voters are more likely to vote for Republicans when 
their concern for the environment declines. We find no evidence for this hypothesis. We then 
test whether representatives adapt to their constituents’ changing views by estimating how the 
voting patterns of representatives change following a change in constituents’ views. We find 
that there is no change in how representatives vote, as measured by a party unity score, an 
economic ideology score, or an environmental friendliness score. Thus, although changes in 
economic conditions affect environmental attitudes, the attitudes in turn do not affect voting 
patterns of the citizens themselves or of their representatives. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes how changes in economic 
conditions can result in changes in environmental attitudes and actual behavior. Section III 
describes our data. Section IV outlines the empirical framework and identification assumptions. 
Section V presents and discusses the results. Section VI concludes. 
 
2.2   Conceptual framework and Related Literature 
2.2.1   Environmental Preferences 
 
Suppose that individuals have preferences over environmental quality (E) and other 
consumption goods (X) and that their preferences can be represented by a single utility 
function      . Their incomes are               , where   is an indicator equal to 1 
if the individual is working and 0 otherwise, and  and   are the earnings the individual 
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receives when working and not working, respectively. The variable    can be thought of as 
unemployment insurance payments and we thus assume that    . Average aggregate 
income will be equal to   ̅             , where  is the aggregate unemployment 
rate. 
If the average wage falls or the aggregate unemployment rate rises, the average aggregate 
income will fall. If environmental quality is a normal good, as is commonly assumed, individuals 
will want to consume less of it and will be willing to trade off a decrease in   for a decrease in  
or increase in .1 However, because environmental quality is typically a public good (e.g., clean 
air and water), we will not necessarily observe a decrease in consumption. Instead, one result 
may be that individuals will state that they prefer a lower environmental quality and higher 
economic growth. It this is true, we expect to see that changing economic conditions affect the 
public’s perception regarding the trade-off between the environment and the economy.  
Many studies have shown that economic factors, especially macroeconomic conditions 
and economic expectation, have played an important role in shaping general attitudes toward 
public policy. Vogel (1989) finds that public attitudes toward regulation are dramatically driven 
by changing economic conditions. During good economic times people are more supportive of 
implementing stringent regulatory efforts on business. Durr (1993) shows that public opinion 
responds strongly to changes in economic expectations. Expectations of a strong economy 
result in greater support for liberal domestic policies, while expectations of declining economic 
circumstances generate more conservative sentiments.  
There is also empirical evidence that macroeconomic conditions shape public 
environmental attitudes specifically. Elliott et al. (1995) and Johnson et al. (2005) find that, as 
real income increases, the public in the US are more supportive of increasing expenditure on 
environmental protection. Kahn and Kotchen (2011) find that increases in unemployment had a 
negative impact on public concern on climate change. This strong association between 
economic prosperity and environmental concern has also been found in many other countries 
outside the U.S. (Inglehart, 1995). 
                                                            
1 Individuals may also be altruistic toward others. In this case, we would expect the subsequent changes in 
attitudes in voting behaviors to be identical to the non-altruistic case. 
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2.2.2   Citizens’ Voting Behavior 
 
Observed changes in preferences may translate into changes in voting behavior. Work in 
political science and political economy has developed several models of voter and 
representative behavior that can be used to make predictions about the effect of changes in 
attitudes on voters and representatives.  
Because environmental protection is typically thought of as a normal good, we expect to 
see higher unemployment rates and lower income increasing the likelihood that individuals 
prefer to sacrifice environmental protection for economic growth. This, in turn, should make 
some of them more likely to vote for candidates that will promote economic growth over 
environmental protection. Because the Democratic Party has traditionally been more likely to 
promote environmental protection legislation, the party affiliation of a candidate may be a 
good proxy for the likelihood that he or she will choose economic growth over environmental 
protection. Therefore, we may find that the share of votes going to a particular party changes 
as voter preferences change.  
Only a handful of studies examine the relationship between environmental concern and 
constituents’ voting behavior, and they find mixed results. Some studies find that 
environmental concerns seldom shape individual vote preference because of low salience (Ladd 
and Bowman, 1995; Repetto, 2006). Guber (2001) finds that preferences for protecting the 
environment over jobs have little impact on electoral choice in the 1996 presidential election. 
These studies show that the changes in stated environmental preferences are not large enough 
to produce noticeable changes in constituents’ voting behavior. Voters tend to focus on few 
issues that are important to them rather than all possible issues. Thus, even if their opinions 
about some issues change, their voting patterns may not. 
 However, other studies find that environmental opinions influence constituents’ voting 
choices. For instance, Davis and Wurth (2003) find that the attitude towards federal spending 
on environmental protection is a significant predictor of voters’ candidate choice in the 1996 
presidential election.  Davis et al. (2008) also find that attitudes towards federal spending on 
the environment had a significant impact on presidential vote in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996. 
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Voters more supportive of increasing spending on environmental protection were more likely 
to vote for Democratic candidates. 
 
 
2.2.3   Representatives’ Voting Behavior 
 
Political scientists have long believed that public opinion has a substantive impact on public 
policy agenda in democratic countries.2  Politicians may well have incentives to change their 
platform or voting behavior to reflect the voters’ preferences. In their seminal work, Page and 
Shapiro (1983) present evidence that public opinion changes are important causes of policy 
change in the US politics, especially for highly salient issues. Erikson et al. (1993) examine the 
linkages between public political attitudes and the choice of state-level policy makers, and find 
that states with more liberal publics tend to pass more liberal policies across a wide range of 
policy domains. Extending this work, Brace et al. (2002) and Norrander (2001) find that specific 
public attitudes influence specific state policy outcomes, even after controlling for the impact 
of public ideology. Stimson (1991) and Stimson et al. (1995) find that members of the Congress 
translate changes in public opinion into policy change: when electoral politicians sense a shift in 
public preferences, they act accordingly to shift the direction of public policy. 
A few studies have also examined the impact of environmental opinion on public policy. 
Brace et al. (2002) have demonstrated that public opinions about environmental spending have 
significant impacts on state-level environmental policy implementation. Hays et al. (1996) find 
that states with more liberal publics tend to elect liberal officials who in turn propose more 
stringent state-level environmental regulations. 
To our knowledge, no study has empirically examined the direct relationship between 
public environmental attitudes and representatives’ voting pattern in Congress. As discussed 
above, politicians may attempt to change their voting patterns to respond to their constituents’ 
preferences. If their constituents’ preferences for environmental protection diminish, we may 
see representatives voting more in favor of economic growth and less in favor of environmental 
                                                            
2 A related literature survey is found in Burstein (2003).   
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protection. On the other hand, the voters who change their beliefs may be inframarginal from 
the viewpoint of their representatives. Then there may be no change in representatives’ voting 
behavior even if there is a noticeable change in environmental attitudes of voters.  
 
 
 
2.3   Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Our public opinion dataset is Gallup’s annual Environmental Poll for the years 2000-2011. In 
March of each year, Gallup conducts a nationally representative telephone poll of about 1,000 
adults to gauge their attitudes toward economic, environmental, and political issues.3 For the 
years 2000-2002, only the respondent’s state of residence is available, while the later years also 
contain the county of residence. 
Our primary goal is to estimate the relationship between economic conditions, proxied for 
by the prevailing unemployment rate or mean income, and whether respondents prioritize 
environmental protection over economic growth. A key advantage of our dataset is that it 
contains a question aimed at capturing this exact tradeoff. Specifically, respondents are asked 
to choose whether they most agree that “protection of the environment should be given 
priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth” or that “economic growth should be 
given priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” In our empirical analysis, we 
code respondents who choose to prioritize environmental protection as 1 and respondents who 
choose to prioritize economic growth as 0. 
Our first proxy for the prevailing economic conditions is the average unemployment rate in 
the respondent’s state over the past 12 months prior to taking the survey. We use monthly, 
seasonally adjusted state-level unemployment rates as reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. County-level unemployment rates are also available for a subset of the counties in 
                                                            
3The annual surveys each contain about 30 questions. Respondents are randomly chosen and interviewed by both 
landline telephones and cellular phones. More details about the survey mechanism can be found from Gallup’s 
Environment Poll Survey at http://www.gallup.com/tag/Environment.aspx. 
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our sample. However, because using county-level rates drastically reduces our sample, we do 
not use them in our primary specification.  
Our second proxy is the average per-capita income in a county, which we obtain from the 
Regional Economic Information Systems (REIS). We use the per-capita net earnings by residents 
(hereafter referred to as “per-capita income”). Because the surveys are always conducted in 
March, we use the previous year’s mean income as the independent variable. 
Our voting data comes from Dave Leip’s “Atlas of US Presidential Elections.” We have 
county-level voting data for the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, as well as for each 
House and Senate election between 2000 and 2010. The datasets contain the number of votes 
cast for the Democratic and Republican parties in each election. From this, we construct a 
measure of the percent of voters who vote for the Democratic Party.  
Because a change in voter priorities can affect the behavior of congressmen with respect 
to the environment, the economy, or both, we use several proxies to capture changes in 
congressmen’s voting behavior. Our first proxy is Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate score for 
each member of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).4 The DW-Nominate score estimates the 
ideological position of each representative using roll call voting records taken in each Congress.5 
It has two dimensions: the first measures ideology on economic matters, while the second 
measures attitudes about salient social issues of the particular period for which it is calculated. 
Because the second dimension is unlikely to be useful in our setting, we focus on the first. The 
score for the first dimension ranges from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). During our 
study period, the average DW-Nominate score for Republican members is 0.61, and that for 
Democratic members is -0.37 (see Table A1). To arrive at our final measure of economic 
ideology, we average each state’s representatives’ scores in each year. 
Our second proxy for representatives’ behavior is Poole and Rosenthal’s party unity scores 
for each legislator, also computed from roll call voting records. It is defined as the percentage of 
                                                            
4 Available from voteview.com. 
5 The scores are calculated using a three-step estimation procedure in which each legislator is assumed to make 
voting choices that maximize his utility function (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).  
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“party unity votes” in which the member voted with his party’s majority.6 Thus, a higher value 
of the party unity score indicates that the legislator is more likely to vote along with the 
majority of his party. As Table A1 shows, the average party unity scores for the two parties are 
quite close, but Republican members have a smaller variance. If a legislator’s constituents 
become more willing to sacrifice economic growth for the environment, we may expect 
Democrats to become more willing to vote with their party (i.e., party unity increases) while 
Republicans should become less willing to vote with their party (i.e., party unity decreases). 
Thus, we average the party unity scores by state and year separately for Republicans and 
Democrats. 
Finally, to capture behavior directly related to the environment, we use the National 
Environmental Scorecard produced by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV).7 LCV keeps 
track of the most important pieces of environmental legislation each year and how 
Congressmen vote on these. The annual LCV score is the percentage of pro-environment votes 
cast by each representative, ranging from 0 to 100. Table A1 summarizes the LCV scores of 
congressional representatives during our study period. The average score is 50.44; Democrats 
score much higher than Republicans (a mean of 87 versus 13), supporting our assumption that 
the Democratic Party is on average more pro-environment. 
We assume that all of these measures remain constant throughout the two years of each 
Congressional session; thus, the state-level measures change every two years. 
Table 1 shows the weighted summary statistics for our sample. Panel A shows the key 
variables for the analysis. Of 11,012 respondents, 55% gave priority to the environment over 
economic growth.8 The average state-level unemployment rate at the time the respondents 
were surveyed was about 5.8% with a standard deviation of 2. Per capita income averaged 
$26,000 in nominal terms, with a standard deviation of $8,500. 
                                                            
6 A party unity vote is defined as one where at least 50% of one party votes in opposition to at least 50% of the 
other party.  
7 Available from www.lcv.org. 
8A very small portion of respondents answered that environmental protection and economic growth are equally 
important, although this was not one of the formal answer choices. We drop these observations along with 
respondents who answered “don’t know” or refused to answer the question.   
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Panel B in Table 1 summarizes respondent characteristics. The mean respondent is about 
47 years old, about half of the respondents are male and an overwhelming majority (84%) are 
white. Almost 35% of the sample is not in the labor force, which is explained by a large fraction 
(20%) of retired respondents. About 40% of the respondents consider themselves conservative 
or very conservative while about 20% consider themselves liberal or very liberal. Finally, about 
40% of our sample has at most a high school degree. 
Figure 1 presents the national trends for unemployment and environmental concern for 
2000-2011.9  For expositional purposes, we show the environmental concern variable as the 
percentage of respondents choosing economic growth over environmental protection. Both 
measures decrease steadily after 2003 and increase rapidly starting in late 2007, suggesting a 
strong association between the two at the national level. Notably, from 2007 to 2010, the 
average state level unemployment rate increased substantially from about 4.5% to over 9.5%, 
while the share of respondents choosing economic growth over the environment increased 
from about 35% to nearly 60%.  
Figure 2 plots the trends separately for each of the four US regions: Northeast, Midwest, 
South and West. A pattern similar to that in Figure 1 emerges: both measures decrease after 
2003 and increase substantially after 2007. This graphic evidence supports the idea that there is 
a strong positive relationship between economic conditions and environmental concern 
throughout the US. Later in the paper, we investigate whether this relationship persists once 
various controls are included. 
 
 
2.4   Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1   The effect of unemployment rates and income on prioritizing the environment 
 
To estimate the effect of statewide unemployment rates on public opinion, we use the 
following regression model: 
 
                                                            
9 Figure 2 and Figure 3 use sampling weights to make the graphs representative of the entire U.S. population.  
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where i indexes respondents, s indexes states, and t indexes years. The variable 
               is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent prefers to prioritize environmental 
protection over economic growth and 0 otherwise. The variable                    is the 
average monthly unemployment rate in state s over the previous 12 months.10 We use this 
measure because it is more likely to represent the underlying economic conditions than the 
unemployment rate in any single month. We also control for age, gender, race, educational 
level, employment status, political ideology, and household income with the vector   . Finally, 
we include state fixed effects,   , to account for time-invariant unobserved factors that vary 
across states and year fixed effects,   , to control for temporal changes that are common to all 
states. 
The coefficient of primary interest is   , which reflects the relationship between changes 
in the statewide unemployment rate and changes in the environmental concern of the public. 
Identification of the model comes from variation in a state’s unemployment rate over time 
relative to the rest of the country. A positive estimate indicates that an increase in the 
unemployment rate leads to increased public support for prioritizing economic growth over the 
environment.  
Because our dependent variable is binary, we use a probit specification to estimate 
Equation 1.11 We use survey sampling weights provided by Gallup to make the estimates 
representative of the entire U.S population. Because the error terms are likely to be correlated 
across time, all standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
In addition to state-level employment rates, we use county-level measures of mean 
income to validate our results: 
 
                                                            
10Because all respondents were interviewed in March each year, the lagged unemployment rates are measured as 
the average unemployment rates from March of last year to February of this year for each state. For the sake of 
exposition, we use the subscript t-1 to represent this measure.  
11 We estimate a linear probability model as a robustness check. Results are very similar and can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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where             is the average annual per capita net income by residents in county c in the 
previous year. The coefficient    provides an estimate of how changes in county income levels 
affect the public concern for the environment.  
We interpret the relationship between environmental concern and economic conditions 
casually, where the latter affects the former. In order to be able to do so, it must be true that 
there does not exist an unobservable factor driving both economic conditions and 
environmental concern at the state-year level. While we cannot test for its presence, we cannot 
think of a reasonable example where such a confounding factor exists.  
Another requirement for causal interpretation is no reverse causality; in other words, 
environmental concern cannot affect economic conditions. While one can think of extreme 
examples where this is violated (e.g., a boycott of environmentally damaging goods causing its 
producer to go bankrupt thus raising the unemployment rate), we believe the lack of reverse 
causality is a reasonable assumption in our context. 
 
 
2.4.2   The Effect of Environmental Concern on Citizens’ and Representatives’ Voting 
Behavior 
 
We proceed to test whether changes in environmental concern in the state change voting 
patterns, either of citizens or their representatives. First, we estimate whether the share of 
individuals voting Republican decreases when people become relatively more concerned about 
the environment: 
 
                                                                    
 
where       is the fraction of individuals voting Republican in either the House or Senate 
election, and               is the average of respondents’ environmental concern in state s 
and year t. If there is a change in voting patterns, we expect    to be negative: in other words, 
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as the average person in the state becomes more likely to prefer environmental protection over 
economic growth, she becomes less likely to vote Republican.  
If there is any change in representatives’ voting patterns, we expect Congressmen in both 
parties to become more likely to vote for environmental protection as their constituents’ 
preferences for it increase. We test whether changes in environmental concern change 
Congressmen’s voting behavior with the following specification:  
 
                                                                      
 
where                is either the average party unity score or pro-environmental score of all 
Congressmen from party   and state   in year  . The party is either Democrat or Republican. 
Because the Democratic Party has traditionally been thought of as more likely to vote for 
environmental protection, we expect Democrats to become more unified with their party 
(    ), while Republicans should become less unified (    ). When the dependent variable 
is the pro-environmental score, we expect representatives from both parties to receive higher 
scores when their constituents’ preferences for environmental protection increase (    ). 
In many cases, we only observe one or two respondents in a given county in a given year. 
This has the potential to introduce a lot of measurement error and attenuate the estimated 
coefficient. We attempt to address this in several ways. First, we aggregate the environmental 
concern variable to the state-year level, which greatly increases the number of respondents 
used to compute the average. We also combine data on environmental concern for years    and 
    to form the state-level measure for year  . Because most of our outcome measures are 
biannual, this has the advantage of increasing the number of responses used to calculate the 
mean without decreasing the total number of observations used to arrive at the estimates. 
Finally, we replicate our results restricting the sample to cases where the environmental 
concern variable is based on at least 15 observations. 
An alternative approach would be to regress the voting patterns of citizens or their 
representatives directly on the unemployment rate or to use the unemployment rate as an 
instrument for environmental concern. However, the unemployment rate is likely to fail the 
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exclusion restriction: there are many reasons why a higher unemployment rate could affect 
voting patterns, with reduced concern for the environment being only one of them. For this 
reason, we consider the effect of environmental concern directly. 
 
 
2.5   Results and Discussion 
2.5.1   The Effect of Unemployment Rates and Income on Environmental Concern 
 
We begin by examining how changes in the state unemployment rate or county-level income 
affect the environmental preferences of the public. Table 2 shows the estimation results based 
on Equations 1 and 2, reporting the marginal elasticities (for the unemployment rate) or 
semielasticities (for the log of income) calculated at sample average value.12 Column 1 uses the 
state-level unemployment rate or county-level income over the last 12 months as the only 
explanatory variable, while the remaining columns correspond to specifications that 
incorporate additional covariates. Estimating Equations 1 and 2 with a linear probability model 
yields very similar results (results shown in Appendix Table A2). 
In Panel A, we focus on the state-level unemployment rate as a proxy for economic 
conditions. All specifications show a significant, negative relationship between the state-level 
unemployment rate and the probability that the respondent chooses environmental protection 
over economic growth. In our preferred specification, which includes state and year fixed 
effects, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.21% reduction in the probability 
that a respondent chooses environmental protection over economic growth.  
In Panel B, we instead use the county-level per capita income as the proxy for economic 
conditions and find similar results. Specifically, a 1% increase in per capita income increases the 
probability that the respondent chooses to prioritize environmental protection over economic 
growth by 0.12%. 
                                                            
12 Raw probit estimates are available upon request. 
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Finally, we consider both the unemployment rate and per capita income to estimate their 
independent effects. The results are shown in Panel C. Holding mean per capita income 
constant, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.67% decrease in the probability 
of the respondent choosing to prioritize environmental protection over economic growth. The 
estimate effect of a 1% increase in the per capita income, holding the unemployment rate 
constant, is 0.11%. 
Overall, there is strong evidence that respondents who live in places with higher 
unemployment rates and lower incomes are more likely to prioritize economic growth over the 
environment. This finding is consistent with the idea that environmental protection is a normal 
good. We next proceed to investigate whether changes in attitudes translate into changes in 
voting patterns or in the behavior of elected representatives. 
 
 
2.5.2   The Effect of Environmental Concern on Citizens’ and Representatives’ Voting 
Behavior 
 
Do changes in attitudes toward the environment translate into changes in how individuals vote? 
To answer this question, we estimate how the state-level share of individuals voting Republican 
changes with changes in environmental attitudes in that state (Equation 3). Table 3 shows the 
results. Because of measurement error concerns, we show the estimates both for the full 
sample (Columns 1-3) and for the sample where we impose the restriction that the mean level 
of environmental concern be calculated from at least 15 individuals (Columns 4-6).  Panel A 
shows the estimates combining both House and Senate elections, while Panels B and C 
separately consider House and Senate elections, respectively. In our preferred specification, 
which includes state and year fixed effects (Columns 3 and 6), the estimates are all insignificant, 
with the exception of Panel A, which is positive and significant, the opposite of what we would 
expect. Because all of the point estimates are positive, we can rule out very small decreases in 
the share of voters voting Republican following an increase in the share of the population that 
prioritizes environmental protection over economic growth.  
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One reason why changes in environmental attitudes may not translate into changes in how 
people vote is because Congressmen pre-empt such changes by altering their platforms or how 
they vote on policies. To test for this possibility, we look at the relationship between changes in 
constituents’ environmental preferences and representatives voting behavior (Equation 4), as 
measured by the DW-NOMINATE scores, the party unity scores, or the LCV environmental 
scorecard. 
The results for the DW-NOMINATE scores are shown in Table 4. As before, we consider the 
House and Senate combined (Panel A), only the House (Panel B), and only the Senate (Panel C). 
A negative coefficient indicates that, following an increase in constituents’ environmental 
concern, representatives’ voting patterns on economic issues become more liberal. Although 
we find some support for this hypothesis when we do not include state fixed effects (Columns 2 
and 5), our preferred specification finds no relationship between the contemporaneous 
environmental concern of constituents and their representatives voting behavior on economic 
issues (Columns 3 and 6).  
The results for the party unity scores are shown in Table 5. In this case, we estimate the 
results separately for Democrats (Panel A) and Republicans (Panel B). Because the Democratic 
Party is on average more pro-environment, we expect an increase in a Republican’s pro-
environmental behavior to translate into a lower party unity score, while that of a Democrat to 
translate into a higher party unity score. As in Table 4, when we do not include state fixed 
effects (Columns 2 and 5), we find strong support for this hypothesis. However, once we control 
for the representatives’ state (Columns 3 and 6), there is no significant relationship between 
constituents’ contemporaneous environmental concerns and representatives’ party unity 
scores. Moreover, the point estimates become drastically smaller, and we can once again rule 
out modest changes in representatives’ behavior. 
Finally, we consider the relationship between constituents’ environmental concerns and 
Congress members’ voting on environmental legislation, as measured by the LCV scorecard. The 
results are shown in Table 6. Again, in our preferred specifications, which include state and year 
fixed effects, we find no evidence that constituents’ environmental attitudes affect how their 
representatives vote on environmental issues. 
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 Our conclusions about voting behavior of Congress members are robust to using the lag 
of environmental concern as the independent variable, as well as to not aggregating the data 
across two years. 
Our previous empirical analysis is based on state average of constituents’ environmental 
concerns and representatives’ voting behavior. A House representative does not need to be 
responsive to all constituents in his state. Rather, he should be more concerned about the 
preferences of constituents in his own congressional district. Moreover, within each state 
voters and representatives from different districts may have quite different environmental 
attitudes. Therefore, one criticism is that aggregation at the state level may ignore this 
variability and fail to produce accurate estimation results. To address this concern, we use more 
localized district-level data to examine the relationship between voters’ environmental 
preferences and voting behavior of House representatives. Our hypothesis is that 
representatives from more pro-environment districts should have lower DW-NOMINATE scores 
and higher LCV scores. 
We re-estimate equation 4, but instead average all relevant variables at the district year 
level, to estimate how the district-level DW-NOMINATE scores and LCV scores change with 
changes in environmental attitudes in that district.13 Table 7 shows the results. We show the 
estimates both for the contemporaneous scores (Columns 1-3) and for the one year lagged 
scores (Columns 4-6). In our preferred specification, which includes district and year fixed 
effects (Columns 3 and 6), the signs of estimates are consistent with our expectation, but they 
are not significant. Similar to previous state-level analysis, we again find no evidence that 
constituents’ environmental attitudes affect how their representatives vote in Congress. 
 Overall, these results demonstrate that although changes in economic conditions affect 
how citizens trade off environmental protection and economic growth, the changes in attitudes 
do not translate into meaningful changes in how citizens vote or how their representatives 
behave. To the extent that individuals are issue voters, the fraction of individuals that alters 
                                                            
13 To aggregate county level data to the congressional district level, we use the MABLE-Geocorr Database, from the 
Missouri Census Data Center. If a county lies partially in multiple districts, we match it to the district with the 
highest population percentage of the county.   
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their vote may not be large enough to change overall voting patterns or trigger representatives 
to change their behavior. Alternatively, there may be a lot of measurement error in our 
construction of the independent variable, causing our estimates to be attenuated. 
 
 
2.6   Conclusion 
 
Due to the presence of irreversibilities in some settings, short-run changes in environmental 
policy can potentially result in long-run changes in environmental quality. It is thus important to 
understand the determinants of environmental policy and attitudes toward the environment. 
This paper examines the relationship between economic conditions, proxied for by state-level 
unemployment rates and county-level income, and public environmental attitudes.  
We find that actual economic conditions exert a substantial influence on public support for 
environmental protection. Higher unemployment rates and lower average incomes significantly 
lower the willingness of individuals to sacrifice economic growth for environmental protection. 
The perception of ongoing economic recession makes people shift their priorities away from 
environmental concerns to more immediate concerns of strengthening the economy. We thus 
expect that pro-environment policies are more likely to gain public support during favorable 
economic conditions. By contrast, during troubled economic times, residents are less willing to 
spend scarce resources on environmental protection which otherwise could be used to boost 
the economy. Such behavior supports the economics notion of the environment being a normal 
good, and is also consistent with psychological theory of hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943).  
However, we find that these noticeable changes in environmental preferences do not 
appear to translate into changes in how people or their representatives vote. One possible 
explanation for this outcome is low salience of environmental concerns on electoral politics 
(Guber, 2001; Repetto, 2006). Although environmental issues have gained increasing public 
attentions over the past several decades, they have seldom ranked as a top public concern on 
political agenda. For example, the 2011 Gallup survey suggests that environmental concerns 
were rated by only 1% of respondents as the most important problem facing the nation, and 
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ranked 22nd overall. In the 2012 Gallup poll, creating jobs, reducing corruption in the federal 
government, and reducing the federal budget deficit were rated by Americans as the most 
important issues for the president to address, whereas dealing with environmental concerns 
was rated as one of the lowest priorities. Voters tend to focus on more important economic 
issues when they vote, and thus changing environmental attitudes are not large enough to 
produce noticeable changes in representatives’ voting pattern.  
Finally, we acknowledge that the finding of little impact of environmental concerns on 
voting behavior may be due to the presence of measurement error in the data. Verifying it with 
a larger sample of individuals is an important step for future research. 
 
 
2.7   Appendix 
 
Previous studies have shown that personal socio-demographic factors influence environmental 
attitudes (Blocker and Eckberg, 1997; Elliott et al., 1997; Greely, 1993; Jones and Carter, 1994; 
Jones and Dunlap, 1992; Kanagy et al., 1994; Klineberg et al., 1998; Uyeki and Holland, 2000). In 
this appendix, we investigate the impact of socioeconomic characteristics on public opinion 
towards the environment. Table A3 shows the results based on estimating equation (1) by 
linear probability model. Other things being equal, men and older persons are less likely to 
prioritize the environment. Respondents with graduate school education tend to be more 
concerned with the environment. By contrast, rich respondents are more likely to give priority 
to economic growth. The effect of political ideology is noteworthy. The coefficients on ideology 
characteristics are all positive and statistically significant, and the magnitudes increase from 
moderate to liberal or very liberal. The results show that, compared with conservatives, liberals 
are more likely to be concerned with the environment. Finally, our results display little evidence 
of a systematic association between environmental concern and the characteristics of 
employment status and race. In general, our results are consistent with past findings that 
younger, better educated and liberal people are more likely to support stronger government 
regulation or greater expenditure to protect the environment.  
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2.8   Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1: Unemployment Rate versus Environmental Concern  
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment Rate versus Environmental Concern by Region 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. N 
Panel A: Key variables 
Environmental priority 0.55 0.50 11,012 
State unemployment rate, past 12 months 5.79 2.03 11,012 
Per capita income last year 26,063 8,572 6,293 
Panel B: Respondent characteristics 
Age 47 17 10,902 
Male 0.48 0.50 11,012 
White 0.84 0.36 10,865 
Employed 0.59 0.49 10,971 
Not in labor force 0.34 0.48 10,971 
Unemployed 0.06 0.24 10,971 
Conservative/very conservative 0.40 0.49 10,727 
Moderate 0.39 0.49 10,727 
Liberal/very liberal 0.21 0.41 10,727 
Less than $20,000 0.16 0.37 10,276 
$20,000-$50,000 0.38 0.48 10,276 
$50,000-$120,000 0.35 0.48 10,276 
Greater than $120,000 0.11 0.31 10,276 
High school or Less 0.38 0.49 10,962 
Some college 0.33 0.47 10,962 
College 0.14 0.35 10,962 
Graduate school 0.15 0.36 10,962 
Variables are weighted by the respondent's sample weight. Respondents who 
refuse to answer or say they do not know are excluded from analysis. 
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Table 2.2: Relationship between Economic Conditions and 
Prioritizing the Environment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Unemployment rate 
State-level unemployment rate -0.37*** -0.35*** 0.02 -0.21** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 11,012 10,135 10,135 10,135 
Panel B: Income 
County-level per capita income (log) 0.14*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.12** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 6,293 5,795 5,795 5,795 
Panel C: Income and unemployment rate 
State-level unemployment rate -0.22** -0.23*** -0.04 -0.67*** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) 
County-level per capita income (log) 0.13*** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 6,293 5,795 5,795 5,795 
The dependent variable is an indicator for the respondent preferring to give priority to 
environmental protection over economic growth. Regressions are weighted to make 
the sample representative of the entire U.S. population.  
Coefficients are marginal elasticities (for the unemployment rate) or semielasticities 
(for log income) calculated as average marginal effect.  
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at 
the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2.3: Relationship between Prioritizing the Environment And Voting 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Percent voting Republican in House or Senate election 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
-0.10** 0.00 0.08** -0.21*** -0.03 0.07 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
State fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 277 277 277 201 201 201 
R-squared 0.02 0.66 0.77 0.06 0.73 0.82 
Panel B: Percent voting Republican in House election 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
-0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.21*** -0.06 0.07 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
State fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 277 277 277 201 201 201 
R-squared 0.02 0.73 0.83 0.07 0.78 0.89 
Panel C: Percent voting Republican in Senate election 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
-0.17*** 0.00 0.08 -0.21** 0.02 0.07 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
State fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.03 0.58 0.64 0.03 0.64 0.69 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** 
significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
  
61 
 
 
Table 2.4: Relationship between Constituents' Environmental Attitudes and 
Representatives' Economic Ideology 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: House and Senate DW-NOMINATE scores 
Fraction choosing environment over 
economic growth 
-0.23** -0.44*** 0.00 -0.35*** -0.75*** -0.01 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.17) (0.07) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 283 283 283 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.92 0.04 0.1 0.92 
Panel B: House DW-NOMINATE scores 
Fraction choosing environment over 
economic growth 
-0.21 -0.41* 0.00 -0.45*** -0.89*** -0.05 
(0.15) (0.21) (0.06) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 236 236 236 183 183 183 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.9 0.05 0.13 0.92 
Panel C: Senate DW-NOMINATE scores 
Fraction choosing environment over 
economic growth 
-0.48*** -0.79*** -0.01 -0.76*** -1.42*** 0.00 
(0.17) (0.21) (0.06) (0.26) (0.34) (0.15) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 236 236 236 183 183 183 
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.89 0.06 0.12 0.89 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 
percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2.5: Relationship between Constituents' Environmental Attitudes and 
Representatives' Party Unity 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Democrats Party Unity score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
6.10 16.53** -1.05 5.09 23.80** -5.60 
(4.70) (6.32) (2.97) (6.28) (9.09) (5.08) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 226 226 226 183 183 183 
R-squared 0.01 0.13 0.83 0 0.15 0.8 
Panel B: Republicans Party Unity score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
-11.76** -15.81*** -2.17 -5.49 -10.55** 0.64 
(5.07) (5.62) (4.78) (4.24) (4.67) (3.27) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 220 220 220 177 177 177 
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.9 0.01 0.11 0.84 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 
5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2.6: Relationship between Constituents' Environmental Attitudes and 
Representatives' LCV Scores 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: House and Senate LCV score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
31.33*** 52.27*** -5.33 44.78*** 91.67*** 1.11 
(11.17) (15.50) (6.32) (14.85) (19.15) (12.93) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 190 190 190 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.03 0.11 0.91 0.05 0.17 0.92 
Panel B: House only LCV score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
24.98** 52.79*** -4.14 36.79** 89.96*** 3.94 
(12.20) (16.35) (9.24) (15.06) (17.81) (11.64) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 190 190 190 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.02 0.12 0.9 0.03 0.19 0.92 
Panel C: Senate only LCV score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
50.76*** 64.01*** -5.97 81.03*** 126.29*** 0.65 
(14.65) (20.22) (12.66) (23.94) (35.29) (31.97) 
Sample All All All 15+ 15+ 15+ 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 190 190 190 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.81 0.07 0.11 0.81 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Dependent variable is the mean League of Conservation Voters score for House and/or Senate members. 
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Table 2.7: Relationship between Constituents' Environmental Attitudes and House 
Representatives' Scores Based on Congressional District 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: LCV Scores 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
7.60*** -0.46 1.31 9.18*** 1.50 0.43 
(2.19) (1.22) (1.19) (2.07) (1.16) (1.11) 
       
District fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2548 2548 2548 2863 2863 2863 
R-squared 0.00 0.82 0.84 0.01 0.81 0.84 
Panel B: DW-NOMINATE Score 
Fraction choosing environment 
over economic growth 
-0.15*** -0.04* -0.03 -0.06* -0.01 -0.00 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
District fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1576 1576 1576 1573 1573 1573 
R-squared 0.01 0.86 0.87 0.00 0.87 0.88 
Standard errors (clustered by congressional district) in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2.A1: Summary Statistics for 
Representatives' Behavior Measures 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Panel A: DW-Nominate score 
All 0.12 0.51  2,651 
Republicans 0.61 0.16  1,324 
Democrats -0.37 0.14  1,323 
Panel B: Party unity score 
All 92.11 8.37  2,653 
Republicans 92.5 6.54  1,326 
Democrats 91.72 9.84  1,327 
Panel C: Environmental Scorecard score 
All 50.44 40.63  3,899 
Republicans 13.34 17.85  1,928 
Democrats 86.77 16.89  1,969 
The DW and Party Unity Scores are based on 
voting records from the 107th Congress to 
112th Congress (2001-2012).  
The Environmental Scorecard data are based 
on voting records from 2004 to 2012.  
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Table 2.A2: Relationship between Economic Conditions and 
Prioritizing The Environment, OLS 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Unemployment rate 
State-level unemployment 
rate 
-0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02** 
0.00  0.00  (0.01) (0.01) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 11,012 10,135 10,135 10,135 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Panel B: Income 
County-level per capita 
income (log) 
0.08*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations 6,293 5,795 5,795 5,795 
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Panel C: Income and unemployment rate 
State-level unemployment 
rate 
-0.02** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
County-level per capita 
income (log) 
0.07*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Respondent characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  No No No Yes 
Observations 6,293 5,795 5,795 5,795 
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.09 
The dependent variable is an indicator for the respondent preferring to give 
priority to environmental protection over economic growth. Regressions are 
weighted to make the sample representative of the entire U.S. population. 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2.A3: OLS Results of Socioeconomic Characteristics 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male dummy -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
White dummy -0.017 -0.008 -0.010 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Some college -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
College -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Graduate School 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Not in Labor Force -0.018 -0.017 -0.014 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Unemployed -0.038 -0.037 -0.026 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Moderate 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Liberal or Very Liberal 0.237*** 0.230*** 0.232*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Income between $20,000 and $50,000 0.005 0.005 0.009 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Income between $50,000 and $120,000 -0.054** -0.059** -0.055** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Income greater than $120,000 -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
    State FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes 
Observations 9,945 9,945 9,945 
R-squared 0.068 0.083 0.090 
 The dependent variable is an indicator for the respondent preferring to give priority to 
environmental protection over economic growth. Regressions are weighted to make the sample 
representative of the entire U.S. population. 
The omitted categories are: High school or less for education; Employed for employment status; 
Very conservative or conservative for political ideology; Less than $20,000 for household 
income. 
Standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses.  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 
percent level.  
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Chapter   3 
Party Effects in the Distribution of Agricultural Disaster 
Payments 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Congress has a long history of helping U.S. farmers deal with natural disasters. On one hand, 
Congress has increased the share of crop insurance premiums paid by the federal government 
from 25.8% of premiums in 1990 to 61.8% today. On the other hand, Congress has also paid out 
ad hoc cash payments in every year since 1990 — on average paying out $1.2 billion annually. 
The problem with paying disaster payments in the face of high crop insurance subsidies is not 
just the redundancy, it’s also the way in which disaster payments are distributed. Unlike crop 
insurance programs that are determined by pre-existing contracts or formulas, ad hoc disaster 
payments are determined solely by legislators after a disaster occurs. This allocation not only 
allows legislators to use the payments to help those farmers hit by a disaster, but also gives 
them opportunities to customize allocation and determine recipients in a way that best serves 
their own constituents. There exists, therefore, a critical need to determine the extent to which 
politicians in the U.S. House and Senate allocate agricultural disaster payments in a way that 
best serves their own constituents. Until we know the amount of political patronage involved in 
disaster payments, we cannot ensure that the unlucky, but otherwise successful, farmer will 
have the freedom to prosper. 
The pork-barrel politics literature in political economy has long believed that government 
redistribution programs are not solely determined by need and altruistic purposes. Rather, 
elected politicians have incentives to trade particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for 
their support. Specifically, there has been a persistent theoretical debate on whether targeting 
benefits to core constituents or to swing constituents produces greater electoral gains for 
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politicians. The “core voter” model predicts that politicians will distribute benefits to core or 
loyal voters, as a means to maximize their expected vote (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Some 
studies supporting the core voter model argue that the strategy of targeting benefits to loyal 
voters is due to turnout buying: encourage and mobilize loyal voters to vote for the incumbent 
party or government (Cox, 2007; Dunning and Stokes, 2008; Nichter, 2008). By contrast, the 
“swing voter” model predicts that politicians will target transfers to swing or indifferent voters, 
because these voters are most likely to change their votes in response to monetary transfers 
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Strokes, 2005). 
Recent empirical studies have examined how the US Congress handles the allocation of 
federal resources. Some studies find a majority party advantage in Congress: the majority party 
uses its influence over the legislative process to distribute more benefits to its loyal areas. This 
finding supports the core voter model. Levitt and Snyder (1995) find that congressional districts 
with a higher share of Democratic votes received more federal assistance expenditures, when 
Democrats controlled the U.S. House and the Presidency during 1984 to 1990. They also find 
that this majority party effect is stronger during the period 1975-1981, when Democrats had a 
majority in both the House and the Senate. Balla et al., (2002) show that House representatives 
from the majority party disproportionately appropriated more academic funds to their 
congressional districts during 1993 to 2000. This party effect on federal spending has also been 
found in the distribution of military procurement expenditures (Carsey and Rundquist, 1999) 
and transportation spending (Lee, 2000).  
By contrast, a few studies provide empirical evidence that parties target distributive 
benefits to swing areas (Stein and Bickers, 1994; Bickers and Stein, 1996; Herron and Theodos, 
2004). These findings support the idea that legislators strategically use distributive benefits to 
buy swing voters in order to enhance their reelection prospects.  
This paper examines the politics of a particular type of legislative distribution – agricultural 
farm disaster payments made through ad hoc emergency legislation during 1990 to 2008. We 
use county-level data on election outcomes and disaster payments to identify the ways in 
which political patronage affects the distribution of agricultural disaster payments. There are 
mainly three aspects that make our dataset suitable for the purpose of this paper. First, during 
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1990 to 2008, agricultural disaster payments were allocated based on ad hoc legislation rather 
than standing disaster programs. The distribution decisions were made solely by legislators. 
Executive branches had no control over the allocation. Therefore, it provides us with a “pure” 
setting to identify the true effect of parties in Congress in the distribution of benefits. For most 
previous studies investigating the distribution of federal resources, the allocation decisions 
were determined by both legislators and bureaucrats. This divided control makes it hard to 
attribute the distribution results to legislators alone, since executive agencies can also influence 
the decisions.1 Possibly, this would explain why previous empirical studies yielded mixed results 
regarding which areas, loyal or swing, receive more distributive benefits. 
Second, Congress switched the majority party over our study period. The Republican party 
gained majority in both chambers of Congress during 1995 to 2006, and the Democratic party 
controlled both chambers in other years. It allows us to examine whether both parties take 
advantage of the status of majority party to direct more benefits towards their members’ 
constituencies. 
Third, our small-geographical-area panel data allow us to account for inherent differences 
in the electorate in each county that would otherwise confound our findings. It is vital that we 
account for such differences because some unobservable factors may drive both the electorate 
and disaster processes. Consider, for example, someplace like Northern Texas where disasters 
are more likely to happen and the electorate is generally more conservative. These might be 
permanent features of north Texas. With our data we will account for the inherent differences 
and identify the relationship between changes in voting patterns and changes in disaster 
payments. This approach will solve a fundamental problem of isolating the effect of voting 
behavior on disaster payment from spurious correlations.2    
                                                            
1 For example, Arnold (1979) shows that, in many cases, the observed relationship between legislators and district-
level awards may be the product of executive decision-making. In particular, if legislators are committee members 
who have jurisdiction over a particular agency, the executive agency is likely to please these legislators by directing 
more awards to constituencies in their districts, due to some political and budgetary goals. Anderson and Tollison 
(1991), Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that, when one party controls Congress and another party controls the 
White House, it is hard to predict the distribution of federal outlays.  
2 Many relevant studies were based on cross-sectional analysis, and thus are subject to omitted variable bias. 
Some studies find that, after controlling for fixed effects, the empirical results change significantly (Levitt and 
Snyder, 1995; Wallis, 1996). 
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Our empirical results show that the allocation of agricultural disaster payment is politically 
motivated. We first show that politically polarized counties receive more payments than do 
swing counties. This finding does not support the swing voter hypothesis that predicts that 
legislators will use distributive benefits to buy swing voters. We next find that, when the 
Republican party controlled Congress, counties with a higher share of Republican votes 
received more payments. Similarly, the share of Democratic votes was positively related to the 
size of payments when the Democratic party controlled Congress. Finally, we find consistent 
results in our congressional district-level analysis: majority party members secured more 
payments to their constituents than minority party members. In sum, partisan counties tend to 
receive disproportionately more payments when their party controls Congress. These results 
are consistent with the idea that political parties target distributive benefits to their loyal 
constituents, supporting the core voter hypothesis.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction on the U.S. agricultural 
disaster payments. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy we employ. Section 4 
interprets the results and section 5 concludes.  
 
 
3.2   Agricultural Disaster Payment in the U.S.  
 
The uncertainty of weather poses substantial risks to agricultural production. Adverse weather 
conditions such as drought, hurricane, hail and heavy snow are devastating to farmers’ financial 
well-being. Over the past several decades, the US government has taken an active role in 
providing agriculture disaster assistance to farmers to mitigate their financial losses as a result 
of natural disasters. The assistance has commonly taken one of three forms: crop insurance, 
emergency loans and direct disaster payments.  
The initial form of direct disaster payments was standing disaster program. As the 
introduction of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 and the Rice Production 
Act of 1975, the first standing disaster program paid farmers of program crops who had 
experienced lower crop yields because of adverse weather conditions. The payments were 
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triggered if farmers had experienced crop losses in excess of one-third of their yields. Between 
1974 and 1980, the US government created a few standing disaster programs that had 
permanent authorization and received regular annual funding. Each standing program had 
specific eligibility criteria that determined how the payments were distributed to farmers. 
During this period, over $3 billion were paid directly to farmers.  
Although the standing disaster programs were popular with crop farmers because of the 
disaster assistance with no premium costs, they were heavily criticized in the late 1970s. These 
programs provided incentives for farmers to keep planting in high-risk areas to continue the 
probability of a loss for receiving government payments. This strategy imposed significant costs 
on society. Moreover, the availability of direct payments gave little incentive for farmers to pay 
for crop insurance coverage. Consequently, in 1980, Congress replaced the standing disaster 
programs with subsidized crop insurance. Since then, the principal form of disaster protection 
has been provided through federal crop insurance programs, and direct disaster payments were 
determined on an ad hoc authorizing legislation basis after a disaster occurred.   
In the 1980s, Congress authorized ad hoc agricultural disaster payments to cover losses to 
specific crops in specific regions. Between 1988 to 2008, Congress authorized ad hoc disaster 
payments for losses to all crops across the country caused by weather-related disasters.3 These 
payments were made available primarily through off-budget emergency supplemental 
appropriations. From 1990 to 2008, about $22.3 billion were paid directly to farmers who 
experienced crop losses caused by natural disasters. The payments fluctuated significantly from 
year to year, depending on disaster magnitudes and the appropriations from Congress. Figure 1 
shows total agricultural disaster payments from 1995 to 2012 in the United States.  
During this ad hoc authorizing legislation period, Congress had full control over the 
distribution of disaster payments. Unlike crop insurance programs and standing disaster 
programs that the eligibility criteria and distribution formulas are already determined by pre-
existing contracts, ad hoc disaster emergency payments are determined solely by legislators 
after a disaster occurs. Congress is directly responsible for specifying the payments formula, 
                                                            
3 Among various natural disasters, drought and flood are two most common reasons for triggering ad hoc disaster 
payments.  
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passing relief appropriation bills, appropriating funds to agencies, and subsequent 
congressional oversight activities.  
The distribution decisions and the amounts of payments are primarily determined within 
four subcommittees from the House and Senate Agriculture and Appropriations Committees.4 
In most cases, a state has only one legislator to represent the state on each subcommittee at a 
time. In each Congress, the majority party will hold a disproportionate share of the seats on 
each subcommittee, and the chairmen will also come from the majority party.  
In 2008, to address the uncertainty of ad hoc legislation, Congress restarted standing 
disaster programs to replace ad hoc disaster payments in providing assistance to farmers. The 
Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 created the Supplemental Agricultural Disaster 
Assistance Program (SADA). The SADA include several standing disaster programs administrated 
by the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA).5 These standing disaster programs were designed to 
provide certainty to farmers on the availability of disaster assistance from year to year.  
 
 
3.3   Data and Empirical Model 
 
The agricultural disaster payments data come through a series of Freedom of Information Act 
requests to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). We finally obtained a dataset on the 
distribution of annual farm disaster payments at the county level for each fiscal year over the 
                                                            
4 In the Senate, the two subcommittees are the Nutrition, Specialty Crop, Food and Agricultural Research 
subcommittee of the Senate Agriculture Committee, and the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration and Related Agencies subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In the House, the 
two subcommittees are the General Farm Commodities and Risk Management subcommittee of the House 
Agricultural Committee, and the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related 
Agencies subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. 
5 The largest disaster program is the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program (SURE), designed to 
compensate eligible farmers for a portion of crop losses that are not covered under the crop insurance program. 
Other disaster programs include Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP), 
Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP), and Tree Assistance 
Program (TAP).  
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period 1990 to 2008.6 As mentioned above, we focus on this period because legislators had full 
control over the distribution of disaster payments during this ad hoc legislation period. The 
original dataset only provides nominal payments for each year. We use the Inflation Calculator 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate the inflation adjusted payments based in 2008 
dollars.  
Our key research question is whether legislators tend to bring more benefits to their loyal 
constituents. We use the average two-party Republican vote share in the most recent senate 
and presidential elections to measure a county’s support for the Republican party. The county-
level senate and presidential voting data come from the Congressional Quarterly’s Voting and 
Elections Collection from 1990 to 2008. There are two reasons that we do not use congressional 
votes. First, congressional votes are significantly affected by incumbency status, and thus 
cannot accurately reflect voter partisan leanings (Gelmand and King, 1990; Levitt and Snyder, 
1995).7 Second, our dataset does not include district-level congressional votes before 2002, 
primarily because redistricting is done every ten years after the US Census Bureau releases new 
population data.  
We expect that some local agricultural characteristics may affect the distribution of 
agricultural disaster payments. If these characteristics are correlated with the voting variables, 
omitting them will result in biased estimates. Therefore, we add a few county-level time-
varying characteristics into our model as control variables, including per capita farm income, 
agricultural employment, fraction of agricultural economy and number of farms. These data 
come from the Census Bureau’s Regional Economic Information System.  
                                                            
6 The fiscal year is the accounting period that begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. We believe it is a 
better choice than calendar year in this analysis because most elections are held in November. If legislators desire 
to use agricultural payments to buy votes, they should have stronger incentives to distribute the payments before 
the November election, rather than after that.  
7 In the political science literature, the theory of congressional stagnation documents the high rate of incumbency 
re-election for the U.S. House of Representatives. The main idea is that House incumbents are almost unbeatable 
in elections. For example, in the 2000 Congressional election, 98% of House incumbents were re-elected. Senate 
and gubernatorial elections do not exhibit this unbeatable feature, let alone more competitive presidential 
elections.  
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We first investigate whether our dataset supports the swing voter hypothesis, which 
predicts that swing areas will receive more payments because of politicians’ vote-buying 
strategy. To this end, we set up our empirical specification as following: 
 
                                                  (1) 
 
                                (2) 
 
where c indexes the county and t the year. Unit of observations is county year.           is 
the per recipient disaster payment made to county c in year t. We convert it into logarithms to 
reduce the skewness of data. One is added before taking the log because some counties did not 
receive a payment in certain years. The variable Swing is used to measure the extent to which 
the county can be seen as a swing area. Specifically, it is measured as one minus the absolute 
deviation of the two-party Republican vote share from 0.5. The Republican vote share is the 
average vote from the most recent senate and presidential elections.8 The variable ranges from 
0.5 to 1. Counties with 50% Republican and 50% Democratic votes (perfectly swing) are 
measured as 1. Counties with 100% Republican or 100% Democratic votes (perfectly polarized) 
are measured as 0.5. If the swing voter hypothesis is correct, we should see a positive sign of 
the estimated  , no matter which party controls Congress.   
As described previously,     are a vector of time-varying control variables that are likely to 
affect disaster payments. We include county and year fixed effects to mitigate the potential 
bias caused by time-invariant spatial and temporal effects that drive both votes and the size of 
disaster payments. The panel structure of the data allows us to use both cross-county variation 
and within-county changes over time to identify the impact of politics.  
Our next step is to test whether there is a party effect in the distribution of agricultural 
disaster payments. To measure party control of Congress, we define that Congress is under 
                                                            
8 The assumption here is that politicians use the most recent voting results to update the belief about their loyal, 
swing and opposing areas.  
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Republican control if the Republican Party has a majority in both chambers of Congress. 
Congress under Democratic control is defined analogously. In our study period, Congress is 
under Republican control during 1995-2006, and under Democratic control during other years.  
The status of majority party plays a significant role in determining the distribution of 
payments. The majority party holds a disproportionate share of the seats on the House and 
Senate Appropriations and Agriculture subcommittees. The majority party usually strategically 
organized the committee system so as to benefit its members’ constituencies (Carsey and 
Rundquist, 1999). In addition, the chairmen of the subcommittees will also come from the 
majority party, who are in a unique position to employ their leadership role to bring more 
benefits to their own constituents (Munson 1993).  
We use the following specification: 
 
                                                              
                              (3) 
 
where                 is the average two-party Republican vote share from the most recent 
senate and presidential elections.9           is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Republicans 
have a majority in both House and Senate, and 0 if Democrats have a majority in both chambers. 
The interaction term indicates that the impact of the Republican vote on disaster payments is 
dependent on which party controls Congress. Based on the arguments presented above, we 
expected to see a positive and significant estimate of   if there exists a majority party effect.  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the key variables. The average county receives 
$410 thousand in disaster farm payment each year, corresponding to $5,345 per recipient. 
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of the payments in years 2000, 2004 and 2008. The 
average two-party Republican vote share is 0.55. The swing county measure is 0.88, meaning 
that the average two-party vote split is about 62% to 38%.  
                                                            
9 In our dataset, senate and presidential votes are significantly positively correlated. The correlation is 0.57.  
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3.4   Results 
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of regressing disaster payments on the even split between 
Republican and Democratic votes. The variable Swing County is measured using equation 2. In 
all specifications, we add county and year fixed effects. Column 1 and 2 use the total payments 
made to counties, while column 3 and 4 use per recipient payments.10 In columns 2 and 4 we 
add the time-varying characteristics. In all cases, we cluster the standard errors by county level 
to deal with potential autocorrelation.  
If the swing voter hypothesis is correct, we expect to find positive sign of the coefficient on 
Swing County, indicating that politicians use distributive benefits to buy swing voters. However, 
our results provide little support for it. The coefficients on Swing County are all negative, 
indicating that more polarized counties receive more disaster payments. For example, the 
results from column 4 indicate that, holding other variables constant, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the measure of swing counties will lead to an approximate decrease of 0.31% in the 
amount of per recipient disaster payments. This effect is more significant if we use the total 
payments as dependent variable. Since both swing and core vote models believe that 
distributing transfers to strong opposing areas is not a rational strategy, we believe that this 
positive effect of polarized counties is primarily driven by the fact that legislators, both 
Democrats and Republicans, target distributive benefits to their supportive areas.   
A few previous studies (Bickers and Stein, 1996; Balla et al., 2002) argue that the impact of 
voting behavior on politicians’ motivation to distribute benefits is not continuous. Rather, it has 
a threshold effect: the effect only occurs in the areas where the incumbents find that they were 
elected with thin margins. In these areas, politicians feel electorally vulnerable and thus have 
incentives to bring more benefits to the areas to buy swing voters, enhancing their reelection 
prospects. For other areas, politicians feel electorally safe and distribute benefits based on 
need.  
                                                            
10 We do not use per capita payment here because agricultural disaster payments are only distributed to farmers, 
not the entire population in a county.  
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To test this, we construct a dummy variable to measure the two-party competition. For 
each county and year, we designate the county as “electorally competitive” and assign 1 if the 
variable Swing County is greater than 0.95, otherwise it is a safe county and assigned 0.11 Table 
3 shows the results. Consistent with the results in Table 2, we find little evidence to support the 
swing voter hypothesis. All coefficients on the swing county measure are not significant. We 
also use other cutoffs as well, including 0.98 (48% to 52%) and 0.92 (42% to 58%), and find 
similar results.  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for equation 3. As before, we control for county and 
year fixed effects. In all specifications, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive and highly significant. These results indicate that republican counties receive more 
payments when Congress is under Republican control. For example, column 4 shows that, after 
including all control variables, ten percentage points increase in the Republican share is 
expected to increase per recipient payments by about 2.15% when the Republican party 
controls Congress. Moreover, the coefficients on the Republican voter share are all negative 
and significant, indicating that democratic counties receive more payments when Congress is 
under Democratic control. The estimates in column 4 show that ten percentage points increase 
in the Democratic vote share will result in 4.6% increase of per recipient disaster payments 
while Congress is under Democratic control. The estimates are qualitatively similar when we 
use the total payments made to counties, as shown by columns 1 and 2. 
Table 5 shows the results for the period 1995 to 2006 only, when the Republican Party 
controlled Congress. Again, we find a significant party effect: disaster payments are heavily 
skewed towards Republican constituencies. We find that a ten-percentage point increase in the 
Republican vote share will increase per recipient disaster payments by about 6.9%.12 We try to 
further illustrate the magnitude of these effects. In 2008, the average county received about 
$7,760 per recipient disaster payments. If a county increases its Republican vote share by 10 
                                                            
11 The cutoff is 45% to 55% for the two-party vote.  
12 In this regression, we find that all control variables are insignificant. When we do not control for county fixed 
effects and run cross-sectional regressions, however, we find that most of them are statistically significantly. It 
indicates that the effects of these control variables on disaster payments are absorbed by county fixed effects.  
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percentage points, say from 0.5 to 0.6, it can expect to see an increase in the payments by 
about $535 per person.  
Table 6 shows the estimates for the effect of the Republican vote share on disaster 
payments over the period 2007 to 2010, when the Democratic Party gained majority in both 
chambers of Congress. Because the majority party in Congress changed, we use this period as a 
falsification test to see whether the Republican vote still has a positive effect on receiving 
disaster payments.13 We find that the coefficients on the Republican vote change from positive 
to negative, and all are significant.14 After the Democratic party controls Congress, democratic 
counties receive more disaster payments than do republican counties. The combined results 
from Table 4 to Table 6 show that the majority party plays a significant role in determining the 
allocation of agricultural disaster payments.  
We finally conduct a congressional district-level analysis to see whether we could still find 
this significant party effect. Our original dataset provides disaster payments made to each zip 
code during 1990 to 2011. We aggregated these data to obtain the total amounts of payments 
received by each congressional district during the 108th (2003-2004), 109th (2005-2006), and 
110th (2007-2008) Congress.15 On average, districts received $6,955,829 in payments in the 
108th Congress, $6,554,027 in the 109th, and $5,297,898 in the 110th. We obtained the party 
affiliation of the US House of Representatives from the Congressional Quarterly’s Voting and 
Elections Collection.  
We examine whether the party affiliation of a district’s representative affects the 
payments received by the district. Table 7 shows the results. House Majority is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether a member of the majority party represented the district in a 
given Congress. Specifically, it equals to 1 if the district’s representative was a Republican 
during the 108th and 109th Congresses, and a Democrat during the 110th Congress. Consistent 
                                                            
13 In the first half of this period (2007-2008), agricultural disaster payments were distributed through ad hoc 
legislation. In the second half of the period (2009-2010), disaster payments were distributed through several 
standing disaster programs.   
14 The control variables are only available from 1990 to 2007 in our dataset, so Table 6 does not include them. To 
make a comparable test, we re-run the regression in Table 5, but only include 2003-2006 data and exclude the 
control variables. As expected, the coefficients on the Republican vote are still positive and very significant.  
15 For those zip codes that belong to multiple districts, we generate the population-weighted payments for each 
congressional district. 
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with our expectation, the positive and significant coefficients indicate that majority party 
members bring more distributive benefits to their constituents than do minority party 
members.16 We find similar results for both measures of the size of disaster payments. The 
results provide further evidence that the majority party with solid control of both chambers can 
significantly influence the distribution to favor their constituents.  
 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the impact of partisanship in the distribution of ad hoc agricultural disaster 
payments. Our results provide strong support for the core voter hypothesis that political parties 
target distributive benefits to their constituents. Partisan counties tend to receive 
disproportionately more disaster payments when their party controls Congress. We find similar 
results in congressional districts: districts represented by majority party members receive more 
payments than districts represented by minority party members. With solid majorities in both 
chambers, it appears that the majority party can quickly and effectively target disaster 
payments to their constituents.  
Although agricultural disaster payment only constitutes a small portion of the federal 
spending, our findings are consistent with Levite and Snyder’s (1995) analysis of federal grants, 
Carsey and Rundquist’s (1999) analysis of defense spending, and Balla et al., (2002) analysis of 
academic awards. All of these studies find evidence of a significant partisan effect in the 
distribution of federal resources. The majority party uses its influence over the appropriation 
process to secure more distributive benefits to its loyal constituents to retain their support for 
its members. These findings indicate that the allocation of federal resources is not based solely 
on need and altruistic intentions. Actually, the process is very political.  
Some extensions are expected for future work. One important explanation for the strategy 
of targeting transfers to loyal areas is turnout buying: politicians use monetary transfers to 
                                                            
16 We do not include district fixed effects here because we have little variation of the dummy explanatory variable 
during the short time span for a given district. We should keep it in mind when interpreting the regression results.  
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mobilize loyal voters to vote. Future work can incorporate voter turnout data into our model to 
see whether areas with higher turnout receive more disaster payments. Moreover, agricultural 
disaster payments are also affected by the magnitude of disasters and the distribution of crop 
insurance payments (Garrett, et al., 2006). Our study does not control for these variables, and 
implicitly assume that they are not correlated with the political variables. Future work is 
expected to add weather data and crop insurance payments to see how these variables affect 
the distribution of ad hoc disaster payments.  
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3.6   Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Agricultural Disaster Payments 1995 to 2012 
 
Source: Environmental Working Group Farm Subsidy Database. The payments from 2009 to 2012 were 
distributed through a few USDA standing disaster programs. 
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Figure 3.2: Agricultural Farm Disaster Payments in 2000, 2004, 2008 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics  
VARIABLES Mean Std.Dev Min Max N 
            
Disaster payments  410,376.60 1,297,969 0 69,024,336 38,114 
Disaster payments per recipient 5,345.39 12,268.29  0  1,166,085  38,114 
      Republican vote share  0.55 0.15  0  1  40,401 
Swing measure  0.88 0.10  0.5  1  40,401 
            
Agricultural disaster farm payments from 1990 to 2008. Unit of observation is county year. All voting 
measures are based on the average Republican vote share in the most recent senate and presidential 
elections.  
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Table 3.2: The Impact of Swing Measures on Disaster Payments 
  Total payment (log) 
Payment per recipient 
(log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Swing County  -0.655*** -0.645** -0.311* -0.318* 
 
(0.252) (0.254) (0.184) (0.185) 
     Other Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 33,128 33,125 33,128 33,125 
R-squared 0.660 0.660 0.604 0.604 
The dependent variable is log(payments+1) for each county over the period 1990 to 2008. County and 
year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the county level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 3.3: The Impact of Dummy on Disaster Payments 
  Total payment (log) 
Payment per recipient 
(log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Swing County (dummy) 0.026 0.028 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.036) (0.036) 
     Other Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 33,128 33,125 33,128 33,125 
R-squared 0.660 0.660 0.604 0.604 
The dependent variable is log(payments+1) for each county over the period 1990 to 2008. Swing County 
is 1 if the two-party vote is inside the range of 45% to 55%, otherwise 0. County and year fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the county level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Republican Votes on Disaster Payments 
  Total payment (log) 
Payment per recipient 
(log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Republican share  -0.562*** -0.577*** -0.437*** -0.462*** 
 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.156) (0.156) 
Republican share X Republican 1.253*** 1.256*** 0.673*** 0.677*** 
Majority (0.285) (0.289) (0.213) (0.215) 
     Other Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 33,128 33,125 33,128 33,125 
R-squared 0.660 0.661 0.604 0.604 
The dependent variable is log(payments+1) for each county over the period 1990 to 2008. Republican 
Majority is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Republicans have a majority in both House and Senate (1995 
to 2006). County and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at 
the county level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Republican Votes on Payments 1995-
2006 
  Total payment (log) 
Payment per recipient 
(log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Republican share  0.986** 0.890** 0.730** 0.689** 
 
(0.421) (0.421) (0.303) (0.304) 
     Other Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 24,162 24,159 24,162 24,159 
R-squared 0.633 0.634 0.568 0.568 
The dependent variable is log(disaster payments+1) for each county over the period 1995 to 2006. 
County and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 3.6: The Impact of Republican Votes on Payments 
2007 to 2010 
  Total payment (log) 
Payment per recipient 
(log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Republican share  0.339 -1.536** -0.335* -1.471*** 
 
(0.279) (0.678) (0.195) (0.485) 
     County Effect No Yes No Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 
R-squared 0.318 0.548 0.268 0.474 
The dependent variable is log(payments+1) for each county over the period 2007 to 2010. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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Table 3.7: Disaster Payments in Districts between 2003 to 2008 
  Total Payment (log) Payment per capita (log) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
House Majority (dummy) 0.832*** 0.830*** 0.700*** 0.809*** 0.807*** 0.679*** 
 
(0.103) (0.104) (0.093) (0.102) (0.103) (0.092) 
       Congress FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.349 0.044 0.044 0.345 
The dependent variable is log(payments) for each congressional district during the 108
th
 (2003-2004), 
109
th
 (2005-2006), and 110
th
 (2007-2008) Congress. Standard errors are clustered at the district level .  
* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent 
level 
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